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INTRODUCTION
We contend that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Rules) should be interpreted in a distinctive fashion, despite
the federal courts’ proclivity to interpret the Rules as if they
were statutes. The Supreme Court itself promulgates the
Rules. Congress does not enact them as statutes through the
traditional path of bicameralism and presentment. As a result,
the principle of legislative supremacy and the related notion
that the federal courts should serve as a faithful agent of Congress, which undergird every traditional theory of statutory interpretation, do not apply in the Rules context. Unlike statutory interpretation, Rules interpretation is not an interbranch
endeavor, but rather an intrabranch one. The Rules, therefore,
require an interpretive theory that is descriptively and normatively grounded within this non-legislative framework. That
said, rule-of-law norms demonstrate that the Rules are authoritative and that they are generally interpretable from a perspective that we call “jurisprudential purposivism.” From these insights, we draw several conclusions: namely, the Rules should
not be interpreted as if they are statutes; the nascent nonstatutory theories of civil rules interpretation are inadequate;
and an administrative law approach presents the best interpretive vision for the Rules. While our proposed model may not be
the last word on the subject—indeed, we hope it is not—we intend it to be the beginning of sustained judicial and scholarly
inquiry in the distinctive field of civil rules interpretive theory.
While statutory interpretation was once considered an
1
overlooked or underappreciated area of scholarly inquiry, this
has dramatically changed over the past several decades. Partly
as a result of Justice Scalia’s intellectual interest in the subject,
his intense preferences on the matter, and his advocacy of a
2
distinctive approach, there has been a revival of interest in

1. See Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and
the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213 (1983).
2. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
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statutory interpretation theory. This has resulted in what
4
some scholars have dubbed “the interpretation wars,” which
generally pit different variations of “the new textualism”
against approaches falling somewhere within the “purposivism”
5
camp. Because mainstream judges and scholars seem to have
assimilated key lessons from both of these perspectives (and
6
the theories may therefore be converging in practice), the most
recent literature seeks to assess the current views and practic7
es of the courts, identify existing similarities and remaining
8
differences between textualist and purposivist theories, and
recognize the differences that exist within each of the broad
9
umbrellas of textualism and purposivism.
Unfortunately, the lavish attention devoted to statutory interpretation has not been replicated for interpretation of the
10
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is an important omisCOURTS AND THE LAW (1997); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
3. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival
of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 244 (1992).
4. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 117, 119 (2009) (“The latest move in the interpretation wars . . .
is to declare something of a truce.”).
5. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How
Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 881 (2015) (“The debate
over how courts do and should interpret statutes has narrowed to two primary
interpretive approaches: textualism and purposivism.”).
6. See generally Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (arguing that it is “time for us to put the
textualism-purposivism debate behind us”).
7. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119
YALE L.J. 1750 (2010) (analyzing state courts’ approaches to modern statutory
interpretation); John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV.
113 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s recent interpretive approach); Richard M.
Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 407 (2015) (analyzing Supreme
Court cases using text, pragmatism, and purpose in interpretation). For examples of recent empirical work, see FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 119 (2009); Anita S.
Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An
Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221 (2010).
8. Compare Molot, supra note 6, at 29–59, with John F. Manning, What
Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006).
9. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 7 (describing different views of
purposivism espoused by Supreme Court Justices); Andrew Tutt, Fifty Shades
of Textualism, 29 J.L. & POL. 309 (2014).
10. There are just a handful of important exceptions to this rule. See Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme
Court’s Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 720 (1988) (arguing that courts should take an expansive view
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sion because federal courts must interpret the Rules in literally
every civil case, and the Rules also serve as a model for most of
11
the states.
And just as in contested statutory cases, interpretive approach matters in Rules cases—a lot. Take, for example, the
12
case of Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group.
Here, “the District Court imposed a Rule 11 sanction in the
amount of $100,000 against [the law firm of] Pavelic & LeFlore
on the ground that the [underlying copyright infringement] . . .
claim had no basis in fact and had not been investigated suffi13
ciently by counsel.” The issue for the Supreme Court was
whether Rule 11, as then drafted, permitted the entry of sanctions only against the attorney who signed the relevant pleading or whether Rule 11 embraced discretion for the district
court to enter sanctions against the entire firm to which the
14
signing attorney belonged. The majority approached Rule 11
as it would “with a statute” and applied a new-textualist meth15
odology that focused on the “plain meaning” of the text. The
Court concluded that the district court could not, consistent

of Rules interpretation); David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927 (advocating an institutional approach to Rules interpretation); Karen Nelson Moore,
The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1993) (proposing an activist approach to Rules interpretation by the Supreme Court); Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 123 (2015) (analyzing the methodologies of Rules interpretation by the Roberts Court); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation:
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099
(2002) (arguing for constrained judicial interpretation of the Rules); see also
Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Institutional Competence and Civil
Rules Interpretation, 101 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 64 (2016) [hereinafter Mulligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence]; Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen
Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188 (2012) [hereinafter Mulligan &
Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure].
11. As a point of perspective, Twombly has already been cited over
250,000 times, which is more than ten times the citations for Brown v. Board
of Education, a much older case. Porter, supra note 10, at 124 n.3; see also
Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703,
710 (2016) (discussing the large formal and informal influence of the Federal
Rules on state practice).
12. 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
13. Id. at 122.
14. Id. at 121.
15. Id. at 123 (“We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain
meaning, and generally with them as with a statute, ‘[w]hen we find the terms
. . . unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.’” (citations omitted)).
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with the text of Rule 11, hold law firms liable for sanctions.
Justice Marshall in dissent, along with the lower courts, took a
17
purposive approach to interpreting Rule 11. From this differing interpretive vantage point, these jurists readily concluded
that firm-wide sanction was consistent with Rule 11 because
“[o]ne of the fundamental purposes of Rule 11 is to strengthen
the hand of the trial judge in his efforts to police abusive litigation practices and to provide him sufficient flexibility to craft
18
penalties appropriate to each case.”
19
Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc. also illustrates the import of Rules interpretive theory. Here, the defendant filed a Rule 50(a) sufficiency-of-the-evidence motion at
the close of plaintiff’s case in chief, yet failed to renew this mo20
tion after the verdict per Rule 50(b). The question for the
Court was whether the court of appeals had the power to re21
view the district court’s Rule 50(a) order on appeal. Looking to
the texts of Rules 50(a) and 50(b) as if they were statutory provisions, and giving especially strong weight to precedent as it
22
typically does in statutory interpretation, the Court held that
the court of appeals lacked the power to consider an appeal of
23
the Rule 50(a) motion in the absence of a Rule 50(b) motion.
Justice Stevens, dissenting, found that the court of appeals re24
tained the power to consider such an appeal. Justice Stevens
broadly distinguished the Rules “as procedure in which we may
have special expertise” from statutes where the Court has “an
overriding duty to obey . . . commands that unambiguously ex25
press the intent of Congress.” To that end, he opined that the
Court should take a “spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [approach that] favors preservation of a court’s power to

16. Id. at 125–26.
17. Id. at 126 (describing the lower court’s heavy reliance on the policies
underlying Rule 11); id. at 129 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he
purposes of the Rule support this construction of Rule 11,” which would allow
for firm-wide sanctions).
18. Id. at 127.
19. 546 U.S. 394 (2006).
20. Id. at 396.
21. Id. at 399.
22. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361,
1364–68 (1988).
23. Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 400–01.
24. Id. at 407 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. Id.
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avoid manifestly unjust results” rather than a narrow, text26
driven approach.
Alongside cases of this nature, there is an additional set of
decisions in which, under the guise of interpretation, the Supreme Court has set a new policy course for the federal judicial
27
28
system. These change-in-policy cases—such as Harris, Wal29
30
31
Mart, Twombly, and Iqbal —are now familiar to students of
federal procedure for both the substantial changes in practice
that have been wrought as well as the questions of interpreta32
tion that have been raised. In each instance, the Court simply
had a different policy preference than the position adopted by
the Advisory Committee or what had been embodied in prior
interpretations of the relevant Rule. In each case, the Court
chose to exercise its power in adjudication to render an “interpretive” about face.
These examples show that interpretive stances—whether
involving textualism, purposivism, adherence to policy set by
the Advisory Committee, or a dynamic approach to setting procedural policy—drive outcomes in Rules cases and profoundly
impact the conduct of federal litigation generally. Much rides
on these interpretive-stance driven decisions: should courts be
free to consider the credibility of video evidence in a summary
33
judgment posture; may workers form a nation-wide class to
34
sue their employer; may defendants be compelled to undergo
35
medical examinations over their protest? And we could go on
and on. Simply ignoring interpretative approaches to Rules
cases as an afterthought, which has been the predominant
practice, is no longer a sustainable position.
In prior work, we took up this interpretive-approach question and argued that the Supreme Court acts as an administrator in the field of civil procedure, borrowing lessons from administrative law to articulate a distinctive approach to Rules

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
See Porter, supra note 10, at 136–42.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
See infra notes 61–71 and accompanying text (discussing Twombly).
Harris, 550 U.S. at 378–81.
Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 345.
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109 (1964).
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interpretation. In developing this position, we took for granted
Justice Frankfurter’s insight that “[p]lainly the Rules are not
37
acts of Congress and can not be treated as such,” without
providing a theoretical justification for this position. We return
to defend this fundamental assumption in this piece.
Here, we turn to first principles and provide a comprehensive argument for the position that the Rules demand a distinctive theory of interpretation. We also claim that our proposed
administrative model is the best available alternative. We
therefore view this project as a “prequel” to our prior work on
this subject, in the sense that it provides the theoretical background for our proposals, as well as the fundamental rationale
for recognizing civil rules interpretive theory as a distinct field
of inquiry that is worthy of greater attention. Thus, even if one
rejects our specific administrative law interpretive approach,
we think that the point that the Rules require a unique interpretive framework is unassailable and should significantly
change the conventional understanding of civil rules interpretation.
We tackle this project in three broad steps. In Part I, the
heart of our argument, we contend that the Rules should not be
treated as if they are statutes for purposes of interpretive theory. Here, we first note that while the Court is not consistent, it
most often interprets the Rules just as it would a statute. We
turn next to rejecting the soundness of this “blackletter view”
both on descriptive grounds and, more importantly, on normative grounds. On the normative point, we show that all theories
of statutory interpretation begin with a key separation-ofpowers principle that the courts must respect legislatively enacted law. This point, however, is inapplicable in the Rules context as the judiciary itself crafts the Rules—not Congress. This
does not mean, however, that the Rules lack authority. Drawing upon legal process theory, we contend that rule-of-law
norms and the principles of institutional settlement and institutional advantage cement the authoritative nature of the
Rules.
In Part II, armed with this newly explicated normative
foundation for the authoritative nature of the Rules, we turn to
the two nascent, non-Rules-as-statutes interpretive approaches
36. Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 10,
at 1194–1205.
37. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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in the scholarly literature. We look first to the inherent authority model, which contends that because the federal courts create the Rules they should be free to interpret them with little
textual restraint. We reject this approach on both rule-of-law
and institutional-settlement grounds. We turn next to the regime-specific purposive model, which contends that, unlike
statutes, the Rules come with a regime-specific commitment to
a purposive, as contrasted with a neo-textualist, approach to
interpretation. While we find much to admire in this view, we
ultimately reject it as it fails to account for the essential choiceof-policymaking-form question that the Supreme Court faces in
Rules cases and fails to embrace the institutional advantages of
court rulemaking in procedural policy setting.
In Part III, we present and defend a refined version of our
administrative law model of Rules interpretation. Because the
Court acts much like an agency in relation to the Rules, we argue that it should interpret the Rules in an agency-like manner. By this, we mean it should pay special attention to the institution that is making Rules decisions, i.e., the lower courts,
38
the Advisory Committee, and the Court itself in adjudication.
Moreover, the Court should route Rules issues to the institution best suited to resolve the issues raised. To this end, we argue that individual exercises of discretion and equity should be
resolved by the lower courts. Matters of broad policy change, we
contend, should be resolved by the Advisory Committee. Finally, we assert that matters of purposive textual interpretation,
which includes the setting of equitable standards as expressions of the Advisory Committee’s textual commitments, should
be set by the Supreme Court as an adjudicator. After addressing potential objections to our view, we conclude that our model
best respects rule-of-law norms and the principle of institutional settlement and makes the fullest use of the various institutional advantages relevant in Rules cases.
I. CIVIL RULES INTERPRETATION AS A DISTINCTIVE
FIELD OF INQUIRY
In this Part, we defend our primary thesis that interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a distinct endeavor from statutory interpretation. We begin by explaining

38. Cf. M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004) (providing an extensive analysis of the policymaking
options available to agencies).
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that, rather than formulating a coherent theory of Rules interpretation, the Supreme Court has either reflexively treated the
Rules as if they were statutes or exercised free-wheeling policy
39
discretion in Rules cases. We turn next to argue that the familiar debates regarding statutory interpretation, which all
rest upon separation-of-powers principles, cannot simply be
transferred to the intrabranch context of Rules interpretation.
After briefly reviewing the process by which the civil rules are
promulgated, we contend that legal process theory and rule-oflaw norms support the authoritative nature of the Rules and
supply a better normative foundation for any civil rules interpretive theory than do legislative-supremacy-linked theories of
statutory interpretation.
A. THE COURT’S VACILLATING APPROACH TO INTERPRETING THE
RULES
Traditionally, when the Supreme Court addresses the matter of Rules interpretation, it reflexively assumes that the
Rules are for all practical purposes just like statutes and
40
should be interpreted as such. Following this approach, the
Court has often espoused a neo-textualist approach to Rules interpretation. In this posture, the Court often holds that “[w]e
give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning.
As with a statute, our inquiry is complete if we find the text of
41
the Rule to be clear and unambiguous.” Similarly, the Court
will often deploy semantic and syntactic rules of statutory con39. See Porter, supra note 10, at 131–42.
40. See, e.g., Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1172 (2013)
(interpreting Rule 54(d)(1) and explaining that as “in all statutory construction cases, we ‘assume that the ordinary meaning of the statutory language
accurately expresses the legislative purpose’” (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009))); see also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988) (noting that the Federal Rules are as “binding
as any statute”).
41. See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S.
533, 540–41 (1991) (“‘We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain
meaning.’ As with a statute, our inquiry is complete if we find the text of the
Rule to be clear and unambiguous.” (quoting Pavelic 7 LeFlore v. Marvel
Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989))); Pavelic, supra at 123 (“We give the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning, and generally with them
as with a statute, ‘when we find the terms unambiguous, judicial inquiry is
complete.’” (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)) (citations omitted)); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980) (using similar language); see also In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price
Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying the Supreme Court’s traditional interpretive approach).
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struction, which tend to be heavily emphasized by neo42
textualist approaches to statutory interpretation, in Rules
43
cases. Further, following this Rules-as-statutes approach, the
Court will eschew policy-driven arguments as proper means of
interpreting the Rules, noting that such policy questions must
44
be sent to the drafters of the Rules. And the Court tends to
apply a heightened stare decisis norm that is generally associ45
ated with statutory interpretation to Rules cases.
Consider, for example, the plurality opinion in Shady
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
where the Justices took just such a Rules-as-statutes ap46
proach. In Shady Grove, New York law allowed insureds to
collect statutory interest from insurers for late benefits payments, but under state law such interest could not be collected
47
as part of a class action. The plaintiffs filed an action in federal court, seeking to certify a class action to collect this statutory
interest under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The issue for
48
the Court was whether, under the Erie doctrine, Rule 23 directly conflicted with the New York law such that Rule 23

42. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 69–166 (identifying and describing numerous semantic and syntactic canons of statutory interpretation).
43. See, e.g., Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 547–48 (2010)
(employing textualist tools in a Rule 15 case); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (applying
expressio unius est exclusio alterius in a Rule 8 pleading case).
44. See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007) (holding in a Rules
case that “‘[w]hatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might
wisely suggest,’ the judge’s job is to construe the statute—not to make it better. The judge ‘must not read in by way of creation,’ but instead abide by the
‘duty of restraint, th[e] humility of function as merely the translator of another’s command.’” (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533 (1947))); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (similar); Amchem. Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591 (1997) (similar).
45. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989)
(recognizing that the principle of stare decisis has “special force” in statutory
interpretation because “Congress remains free to alter what we have done”).
The Advisory Committee is similarly free to “correct” interpretive errors by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11, advisory committee notes to 1993
amendments (“This provision is designed to remove the restrictions of the former rule.”). As such, the Court will often deploy stare decisis with special force
in Rules cases. See Johnson v. Shelby, Miss., 135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (relying strictly upon older, even questionable post-Twombly, interpretations to reverse in Rule 8 pleading cases).
46. 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
47. Id. at 397.
48. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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49

would govern under Hanna or whether Rule 23 could be in50
terpreted so as to avoid conflict with the New York statute.
51
The plurality interpreted Rule 23 as if it were a statute. In so
doing, the plurality looked exclusively to the plain meaning of
Rule 23’s text, deploying semantic interpretive tools, to con52
clude that Rule 23 conflicted with New York law. Further embracing this interpretive stance, the plurality specifically eschewed a purposive or otherwise contextualized analysis in
53
favor of this neo-textualist approach. Moreover, again in line
with a Rules-as-statutes approach, the plurality concluded that
judicial policy preferences—such as the Erie doctrine’s policy to
avoid creating incentives to forum shop as between the state
and federal courts—must give way to the policy set in the Rules
54
(which the plurality presented as congressionally set policy).
Here, each interpretive stance by the Shady Grove plurality
took a Rules-as-statutes approach. Moreover, as discussed
above, the Court took just such a Rules-as-statutes approach in
55
56
Pavelic & LeFlore and Unitherm Food Systems as well, as it
has in scores upon scores of other cases.
This statutory-centric view of Rules interpretation does not
57
always carry the day, however. Despite the Court’s frequent
odes celebrating a strict statutory approach to Rules interpretation, it often engages with Rules cases from a decidedly non58
statutory-text perspective. Indeed, this policy-driven approach
to the Rules has grabbed headlines as demonstrated by cases

49. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463–64 (1965).
50. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980).
51. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 400 (“Congress . . . has ultimate authority over the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Porter, supra note 10, at 136
(concluding that the plurality takes a statutory interpretive approach).
52. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398–400.
53. See id. at 405 n.7 (rejecting the dissent’s “suggest[ion] that we should
read the Federal Rules ‘with sensitivity to important state interests’ and ‘to
avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies’”).
54. Id. at 416 (“But divergence from state law, with the attendant consequence of forum shopping, is the inevitable (indeed, one might say the intended) result of a uniform system of federal procedure. Congress itself has created
the possibility that the same case may follow a different course if filed in federal instead of state court.”).
55. See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text (discussing the case).
56. See supra notes 19–26 and accompanying text (discussing the case).
57. See Porter, supra note 10, at 131–42 (identifying and describing two
distinct methodologies of Rules interpretation invoked by the Roberts Court).
58. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note
10, at 1195–97; Porter, supra note 10, at 136–42.
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such as Harris, Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Iqbal. In this family
of cases, we see the Court divorce itself from text, often almost
60
entirely, and look predominately to policy.
Twombly presents a prime example. After decades of upholding the “no set of facts” standard for adjudicating motions
61
to dismiss under Conley v. Gibson, the Court changed course
in Twombly, an antitrust class-action suit against several tele62
communications providers. The complaint asserted simply
that the defendants had colluded in violation of the antitrust
laws but failed to provide any specific factual allegations of an
63
unlawful agreement in support of that claim. While the plaintiffs’ bare allegations would have survived a Rule 12(b)(6) chal64
the
lenge under the well-established Conley standard,
65
Twombly Court charted a new course and overruled Conley. In
lieu of the Conley standard, the Twombly Court required a reviewing court to disregard all recitals in a complaint that are
mere legal conclusions and assess whether the well-pleaded
66
factual allegations state a claim for relief that is “plausible.”
In effect, the opinion crafted a new and more demanding test
for assessing the sufficiency of complaints. What is key for our
discussion is that the Court explicitly predicated this more rigorous standard on its desire to avoid the high costs of discovery
67
and related incentives to settle unmeritorious cases.
Indeed, commentators almost universally recognized
Twombly as a pronouncement regarding the policy underlying

59. See supra notes 28–31 (citing these cases).
60. See Porter, supra note 10, at 149–53 (recognizing and describing this
phenomenon).
61. 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). The Court had regularly upheld this standard for the fifty years between Conley and Twombly. See, e.g., Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
507 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown,
466 U.S. 147, 149–50 n.3 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.
738, 746 (1976); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506 (1959).
62. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549–50 (2007).
63. Id. at 565 n.10.
64. Id. at 561.
65. Id. at 563 (retiring the key passage from Conley).
66. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).
67. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59; Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C.
Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 826–27
(2010) (reviewing Twombly).
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68

pleading requirements in federal court and, by extension,
69
state court —not as an interpretation of Rule 8’s text. Indeed,
proponents of the opinion welcomed it, not because of its textu70
al parsing, but rather because it limited discovery costs. Critics also tended to focus their discontent on the policy implica71
tions of Twombly as opposed to interpretive difficulties.
When the Court acts in this non-textualist mode, as in
Twombly, it offers little commitment to stare decisis norms of
72
the type one expects in the statutory interpretation arena. In
an entire series of cases, from the use of video evidence on
summary judgment to certification of class actions, the Court’s
interaction with the Rules can hardly be described as the
straightforward exercise of statutory interpretation—at least
73
not with a straight face. Importantly, the Court has not provided any principled explanation for deviating from its traditional statutory approach to Rules cases, or even acknowledged
that it is adopting a fundamentally different interpretive meth74
odology.
68. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the
same).
69. For examples of how state high courts have responded to Twombly
and Iqbal, see Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra
note 10, at 1196 n.32.
70. See, e.g., Mark Herrmann et al., Debate, Plausible Denial: Should
Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141,
142–47 (2009) (opening statement of Herrmann and Beck arguing that
Twombly and Iqbal were properly decided in an adjudication, are correct interpretations of Rule 8, and set sound policy); Lynn C. Tyler, Recent Supreme
Court Decision Heightens Pleading Standards, Holds out Hope for Reducing
Discovery Costs, 78 PTCJ 169 (2009).
71. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised:
A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431; see also Mulligan &
Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 10, at 1197 & nn.35–39
(describing these critiques and collecting sources). There were some interpretation-based critiques as well. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK
53 (2008) (contending that the Court in Twombly could not possibly have
based its decision on “legalist” principles); Marcus, supra note 10, at 974
(“Every relevant indicator suggests that the Court misinterpreted Rule 8 in
Twombly and Iqbal.”); Spencer, supra, at 448–50, 461–73 (2008) (detailing the
many ways in which the Twombly rule deviates from past practice, the text,
the intent, and the legislative history of Rule 8).
72. Cf. supra note 45 (describing the role of stare decisis in statutory interpretation).
73. See Porter, supra note 10, at 136–37.
74. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 928 (claiming that the Court’s interpretive methodology in Rules cases varies “wildly and inexplicably”); Porter, supra note 10, at 142, 156 (describing “the Roberts Court’s interpretive bipolari-
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B. REJECTING THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION MODEL
The Court’s split personality when it engages with the
Rules presents prima facie problems. In ordinary moments, the
Court tends to adopt a Rules-as-statutes approach. Yet there is
a substantial minority of cases where the Court disregards this
Rules-as-statutes approach and exercises free-wheeling policy
discretion. Adopting a Rules-as-statutes model, as we go on to
discuss, as a foundational theory of interpretation faces two essential difficulties: one descriptive and one normative.
First, the Rules-as-statutes approach is burdened with the
difficulty of a descriptive disconnect from a substantial minority of the Court’s own practice. Of course, developing an interpretive theory for the Rules necessarily is a normative endeav75
or. As such, a mismatch between normative theory and actual
practice need not be a strike against the normative approach
per se. Indeed, often the point of an interpretive theory is to
steer away from past errors or misguided practices in interpretation. Nevertheless, a radical departure from practice, one
which simply paints over major swathes of the Court’s exercise
of its policy-setting muscle, should be viewed as a strike
against an interpretive theory of the Rules. Seeing value in this
76
Aristotelian approach to normative endeavors such as pre77
senting an interpretive theory for the Rules, we take the position that the Rules-as-statutes position’s lack of a robust descriptive fit is a strike against adoption of this view.
As such, we turn now to an examination of first normative
principles in regard to the application of statutory interpretive
ty,” and recognizing “the Court’s lack of transparency and self-reflection about
its” disparate approaches).
75. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45–86 (1986) (characterizing
“interpretive” theories as reflecting interacting considerations of “fit” and “justification”); Marcus, supra note 10, at 930 (“The dearth of interpretive theory
for the Federal Rules means that the normative defense of a methodology
must begin with the basic questions of the sort often lost in the surfeit of
commentary on statutory interpretation.”).
76. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (H. Rackham ed. & trans.,
1975).
77. The first task in these endeavors, Aristotle argues, is to review the
prevailing thoughts of the wise on the subject. Cf. id. at 1095a–b. Then, from
these many views one must establish a first principle in such a manner so that
“all the facts harmonize with” a true account. Id. at 1098b10. Then after having harmonized the facts into a first principle, Aristotle instructs us to reapply
it to the world. That is, Aristotle uses first principles to help shed new light
upon current controversies, as well as to help explain why the previous attempts went wrong.
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theory to Rules cases. The first principle of statutory interpre78
tation is the concept of “legislative supremacy.” This principle
recognizes that statutory interpretation involves “an
interbranch encounter of sorts,” which “represents the legal
moment when a court confronts the product of the legislative
79
branch and must assign meaning to a contested provision.” As
such, “the court must adopt—at least implicitly—a theory
about its own role by defining the goal and methodology of the
interpretive enterprise and by taking an institutional stance in
80
relation to the legislature.” For similar reasons, statutory interpretation necessarily implicates democratic theory and related understandings of the separation of powers that are en81
shrined in the Constitution. Legislative supremacy, in turn,
reflects “the idea that the legislature has legitimate authority
to make laws, and that the judiciary must respect that authori82
ty in making its [interpretive] decisions.” This principle suggests that courts should serve as the “faithful agents” of the
legislature when they interpret statutes, and that the judiciary
is subordinate to the legislature in the making of public poli83
cy. “Fidelity to the legislature is thought to satisfy the demands of democratic theory by allowing popularly elected officials, presumed to be accountable to their constituents, to make
84
policy decisions.” Meanwhile, because federal judges are unelected and politically unaccountable, liberal democratic theory
seeks to limit the policymaking discretion of courts by requiring
78. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78
GEO. L.J. 319 (1989); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989).
79. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 593 (1995).
80. Id. at 593–94.
81. See Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685,
1686 (1988) (“Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about
constitutional law. It must at the very least assume a set of legitimate institutional roles and legitimate institutional procedures that inform interpretation.”).
82. Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the
Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 810 (1994) (quoting Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and
Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Underenforcement,
Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV.
767, 769 (1991)).
83. See Farber, supra note 78, at 283; John F. Manning, Textualism and
the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001); Redish & Chung, supra note 82, at 810–11.
84. Schacter, supra note 79, at 594.
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them to justify their interpretive decisions as the product of the
85
policy choices of elected officials.
The intellectual development of statutory interpretive theory highlights this fundamental linkage of statutory interpretation to the notion of legislative supremacy. Traditionally, the
principle of legislative supremacy was reflected by the
“originalist imperative,” the idea that the animating goal of
statutory interpretation was to ascertain and implement the
86
legislature’s subjective intent. In the years following World
War II and the New Deal, a rough consensus emerged in favor
of the purposive approach to statutory interpretation that was
exemplified by the legal process theory advocated by Professors
87
Hart and Sacks. Instead of focusing on the legislature’s subjective intent with respect to the precise question at issue, legal
process theory sought to identify the objective purposes that a
reasonable person would attribute to a statute and its operative
provisions, and to determine the best way to carry out those
purposes under the circumstances presented in each case. In
the last quarter of the twentieth century, new textualism arose
as a means to constrain the policymaking discretion of the judiciary inherent in a purposive approach so as to better respect a
particular understanding of the constitutional structure and
the workings of the legislative process. The advocates of this
view typically maintain that courts should rely primarily on
textual sources of meaning, including the ordinary understanding of the operative provisions, related parts of the same act or
the whole code, and established canons of statutory interpretation, to ascertain the objective meaning of the statutory text to
88
a reasonable user of English. New textualists conclude that
this approach should be adopted by a faithful agent of the legislature because “the precise lines drawn by any statute may reflect unrecorded compromises among interest groups, unknow-

85. See Eskridge, supra note 78, at 344–45.
86. See Schacter, supra note 79, at 594; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 221 (2d ed. 2006)
(“Anglo-American theories of statutory interpretation have traditionally emphasized legislative intent as the object or goal of statutory interpretation.”).
87. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE LEGAL PROCESS]; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical
Introduction to the Legal Process, in THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra, at li–cxxxvi.
88. See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 86, at 235–36 (describing sources
of guidance consulted by textualists).
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able strategic behavior, or even an implicit legislative decision
89
to forgo costly bargaining over greater textual precision.” New
textualists will only consider a statute’s underlying purposes or
its policy consequences in a particular case to resolve ambiguity, which exists only when a court is required to choose from
among two or more linguistically permissible meanings that
remain after a thorough examination of a statute’s “semantic
90
context.”
To be sure, these competing statutory interpretative theories are based on fundamentally different conceptions of democracy, the rule of law, the constitutional structure, and the
91
role of federal courts. Textualism gives the utmost priority to
a statute’s semantic context and the way in which a reasonable
person who knows all of the rules of grammar and syntax
would use words, whereas purposivism privileges a statute’s
policy context and how a reasonable person would address the
92
mischief that a statute was designed to cure. Thus, these leading foundational theories of statutory interpretation understand the principle of legislative supremacy in different ways
and have different conceptions of the proper role of a faithful
agent of Congress. Nevertheless, they all agree that federal
courts are subordinate to Congress as a policy-maker and that
the judiciary must be able to attribute the outcomes of statuto93
ry cases in a meaningful way to “legislative choice.”
This first principle of statutory interpretation—i.e., attributing outcomes in particular cases to the choices of a separate
branch of government based upon separation-of-powers
norms—does not apply to cases involving the Rules. If statutory
interpretation is necessarily “an interbranch encounter of
94
sorts” that raises separation of powers concerns, this is not
true of Rules interpretation. Rather, the Rules Enabling Act
provides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure” for cases in
89. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387,
2390 (2003).
90. Id. at 2408.
91. See generally Siegel, supra note 4 (describing the divergent theories);
Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L.
REV. 209 (2015) (discussing fundamental differences between competing conceptions of statutory interpretation).
92. See Manning, supra note 8, at 76.
93. See id. at 96; see also Farber, supra note 78, at 284–92 (distinguishing
between strong and weak conceptions of legislative supremacy).
94. Schacter, supra note 79, at 593–94.
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95

the lower federal courts. While much of the drafting and other
work that goes into promulgating and amending the Rules is
carried out by judiciary committees, the members of those judiciary committees are appointed by the Chief Justice, and their
recommendations are reviewed and must be approved by the
96
Supreme Court.
Congress is, of course, also provided with an opportunity to
review and potentially veto proposed rules before they go into
effect, but we do not find that such a procedure imbues the
Rules with the same separation-of-powers normative underpinnings as statutory law. In this regard, we are of the same
mind as Justice Frankfurter. We agree with him that “little
significance attaches to the fact that the Rules, in accordance
with the statute, remained on the table of two Houses of Congress without evoking any objection . . . [before they] came into
97
force.” As he explained, when one compares “the mechanics of
legislation and the practical conditions surrounding the business of Congress” with the procedure surrounding the potential
veto of a procedural rule, “to draw any inference of tacit ap98
proval from non-action by Congress is to appeal to unreality.”
As he bluntly put it, “Plainly the Rules are not acts of Congress
99
and can not be treated as such.” Agreeing with Justice Frankfurter in this regard as we do, we conclude that when federal
courts interpret the Rules, they are presented with an
intrabranch encounter of sorts, and as such the principle of leg100
islative supremacy is inapplicable.
Moreover, because the Court was formally delegated authority to promulgate the Rules by Congress, it makes little
sense to understand the Court as a subordinate policy-maker
95. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012).
96. See infra Part I.C.
97. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. We believe that the structural safeguards provided by the committee
process, including the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures described
below, prevent this arrangement from establishing an unconstitutional delegation of both lawmaking and law-elaboration authority to the same actors.
Cf. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 618 (1996) (claiming that “the core of the separation of powers doctrine includes the requirement of some minimum separation between lawmaking and law-exposition,”
which is allegedly violated when courts give strong deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations).

2017]

CIVIL RULES INTERPRETIVE THEORY

2185
101

with respect to Rules issues or as a “faithful agent” of itself.
This is particularly true given the Court’s influence over the
personnel on the rulemaking committees, and its obligation to
approve of the contents of proposed rules before they can become effective. Although we believe that the rule of law and a
jurisprudential principle of institutional settlement obligate
federal courts to follow the ascertainable decisions of the
102
rulemakers, there is otherwise little need for the judiciary to
attribute the resolution of interpretive problems to
“rulemakers’ choice” or to follow “an originalist imperative”
purely on democratic legitimacy grounds. Indeed, the Rules are
widely understood to contain interstitial gaps, which are designed to be filled by common-law forms of decisionmaking or
the application of discretionary judgment, and thereby effectively sub-delegate policymaking authority to federal courts.
Procedural policymaking by federal courts should therefore not
be anathema for the reasons that underlie the concept of legislative supremacy, and which have guided the development of
103
the leading theories of statutory interpretation.
We are not the first scholars to recognize that legislative
supremacy is not the proper starting point for Rules interpretation. Joseph Bauer briefly discussed this same conclusion sev104
eral decades ago. Our aims here, then, are twofold. One, by
reiterating and expanding upon this point we hope to collective-

101. Cf. Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the
Interpretation of Instructions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY
LAW 334 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (claiming that the fiduciary duties that an agent owes to her principle is to follow “her understanding
of her principal’s present statement of intentions,” even when the principal’s
“preferences have changed”).
102. See infra Part I.D.
103. Some scholars have embraced judicial discretion in statutory interpretation and suggested that courts should be viewed as “cooperative partners” of
the legislature. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 75; William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). While federal courts (and especially the Court) could plausibly think of themselves as
“cooperative partners” of the rulemakers in the context of Rules interpretation, this idea would merely beg the question of how the judiciary should implement the Rules. Accordingly, we do not think that anything meaningful
turns on adopting or rejecting this label in this context.
104. Bauer, supra note 10, at 720 (“In construing the Federal Rules, the
courts are interpreting standards which the Supreme Court itself has promulgated. Therefore, some of the problems which occur during statutory interpretation, such as ferreting out legislative intent, deferring to another branch of
the government, or avoiding violations of principles of federalism by deferring
to state interests, are in large measure eliminated.”).
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ly draw renewed attention to this essential normative distinction at play in Rules cases. And two, we aim to add a normative
foundation upon which to rest Rules interpretation in the absence of legislative supremacy that is currently lacking in the
literature.
Accordingly, we do not think that any of the leading foundational theories of statutory interpretation, based as they are
upon the separation-of-powers concept of legislative supremacy,
can simply be transplanted unreflectively into the Rules interpretation context. Rather, civil rules interpretive theory should
be understood as a distinctive field of inquiry, which turns on
the particular nature of the court rulemaking process, broader
jurisprudential principles, and related questions of institutional competence.
C. THE COURT RULEMAKING PROCESS
We therefore turn to a brief description of the court rulemaking process, which differs substantially from the traditional legislative process. Court rulemaking has evolved over time
to become an elaborate affair that takes two to three years to
105
complete. Congress originally enacted the Rules Enabling
Act, which empowered the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
of practice and procedure for the lower federal courts, in
106
1934. Although the Act did not establish a committee process,
the Court appointed a fourteen-person Advisory Committee to
conduct the research and drafting necessary to create the origi107
nal Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the first incarnation of the rulemaking process, the Court directly reviewed the
work of the Advisory Committee and, when satisfied, reported
108
the promulgated Rules to Congress, which could overrule any

105. See Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44
AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1671–72 (1995).
106. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2012)). For detailed histories of the
Rules Enabling Act and recent amendments to the rulemaking process, see
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015
(1982) (providing a detailed history of the Rules Enabling Act); Struve, supra
note 10, at 1103–18 (reviewing the then-most recent amendments to the rulemaking process).
107. See Order, Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774 (1935) (initially appointing the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee); see also Order, 297 U.S. 731 (1936) (replacing a committee member and renewing the Advisory Committee’s charge).
108. See Act of June 19, 1934, § 1.
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of the proposed rules by exercising the “legislative veto” built
into the 1934 Act during the specified “report-and-wait peri109
While the Court routinely deferred to the Advisory
od.”
110
Committee’s proposals during this early period, it did on occasion exercise its authority to revise Advisory Committee pro111
posals prior to submission to Congress.
Since the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act, the
Rules drafting process is more open to public participation,
112
while at the same time more reticulated. The current version
of the Rules Enabling Act mandates the use of an advisory
113
committee. Unlike past committees dominated by practitioners, the committee is now made up of seven federal district
court judges, one federal appellate court judge, one state-court
judge, four practitioners, one representative from the Depart114
ment of Justice, and one academic. The current act also requires the Judicial Conference to publish its procedures for
115
amendment and adoption of Rules; to conduct open and publicly noticed meetings, record the minutes, and make those
116
minutes publicly available; to submit proposed amendments
117
for public comment; and to attach official drafters’ notes to
118
Rule proposals.
119
The current rulemaking process comprises seven steps,
120
which is now very much a bottom-up approach to rulemaking.
109. See id. § 2.
110. See Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme
Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 677 (1975).
111. See Struve, supra note 10, at 1106 n.11. At least once, the Court exercised its rulemaking authority directly in amending a Rule of Criminal Procedure, bypassing the Advisory Committee entirely. See Charles E. Clark, The
Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. AM. JUDICATURE
SOC. 250, 257 (1963).
112. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2075).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b).
114. See Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure Chairs and Reporters, (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/committee-roster
.pdf.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(1).
116. Id. § 2073(c)(1)–(2).
117. Id.
118. Id. § 2073(d).
119. See Procedures for the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference
Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 195 F.R.D. 386 (2000) [hereinafter Rulemaking Procedures].
120. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80
WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 913–17 (2002) (describing top down versus bottom up ap-
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First, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts collects recommendations for new Rules or amendments from the
121
public, practitioners, and judges. These suggestions are for122
warded to the appropriate Advisory Committee’s reporter
(typically a law professor assigned to each advisory committee
to set the agenda and do the initial drafting of Rule revisions
123
and explanatory notes ), who makes an initial recommendation for action to the Advisory Committee. Second, to go forward with a Rules revision, the Advisory Committee must
submit the proposed revision and explanatory note, and any
dissenting views, to the Standing Committee in order to obtain
permission to advance to the publication and comment peri124
od. Third, the Advisory Committee publishes the proposed
revision widely, receives public comment, and holds public
125
hearings. At the conclusion of the notice-and-comment period,
the Advisory Committee’s reporter summarizes the results of
the public input and presents them to the Advisory Commit126
tee. If the Advisory Committee finds that no substantial
changes to the proposal are called for, it transmits the revision
and accompanying notes and reports to the Standing Commit127
tee. If the Advisory Committee makes substantial changes to
the proposed revision, it must go through another round of pub128
lic notice-and-comment. If it makes substantial changes to
the proposed revisions, the Standing Committee returns the
129
proposed revision to the Advisory Committee. If the Standing
Committee does not make substantial changes, it sends the
130
proposed revision to the Judicial Conference. Fifth, the Judicial Conference considers proposed revisions each September,
sending approved revisions to the Court or rejected proposals
131
back to the Standing Committee. Sixth, the Court takes the
proposed revisions under advisement from September to May 1
of the following year, at which time it must transmit to Conproaches).
121. See McCabe, supra note 105, at 1672.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1664–65.
124. Id. at 1672.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1672–73.
128. Id. at 1673.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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132

gress those Rules it seeks to promulgate. Seventh, under the
current law, Congress’s report-and-wait period runs another
seven months from May 1 to December 1, at which time unal133
tered revisions to the Rules become law. The court rulemaking process therefore results in the mandatory creation of an
extensive rulemaking record, which is available to participants
in the rulemaking process, members of Congress, the President,
134
and the general public.
In practice, this approach to rulemaking has two key virtues that lead to effective rulemaking. First, it promotes the
use of empirical data in decisionmaking. As past Advisory
Committee chair Mark R. Kravitz has noted, the Advisory
Committee is “committed to gathering empirical data about the
operation of the rules and any proposed rule changes so that we
135
better understand the likely effect of rule revisions.” Moreover, the Federal Judicial Center, the research arm of the judiciary, works with the Advisory Committee to supply empirical
136
studies of Rules issues. Second, the legal community engages
actively with the Advisory Committee in notice-and-comment
periods. For example, the December 2015 Rules amendments
received more than 2300 comments, many of which claimed
that the proposed amendments were biased in favor of defend137
ants. In part because it regularly uses sound empirical evidence and subjects its recommendations to vigorous notice and
comment, many conclude that the Advisory Committee produc-

132. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2012).
133. Id. If Congress decides to reject or modify proposed changes during
this period, it must promulgate a joint resolution that satisfies the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 7; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935 n.9 (1983).
134. See Rulemaking Procedures, supra note 119, at 387–93.
135. Mark R. Kravitz, To Revise, or Not To Revise: That Is the Question, 87
DENV. U. L. REV. 213, 217 (2010).
136. See Will Rhee, Evidence-Based Federal Civil Rulemaking: A New Contemporaneous Case Coding Rule, 33 PACE L. REV. 60, 70 (2013); Russell
Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics of Judicial Administration: Creating the Federal Judicial Center, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 39–40
(1988).
137. See Tony Mauro, Lawyers Spar over Discovery Rules; Litigation Costs
at Center of Debate, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal
.com/id=1202644114459/Lawyers-Spar-Over-Discovery-Rules; Rebecca L.
Shult, 2,000+ Public Comments Submitted Responding to Proposed Changes to
FRCP, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx
?g=dd0982a2-7c5a-4001-8380-648939119c8a.
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138

es strong, non-biased rules that reflect principled deliberation
139
worthy of deep respect.
Of course, the rulemaking process is not without fault or
critics. First, the current seven-step rulemaking process is by
140
most assessments, including our own, overly ossified, taking
141
two and a half years to promulgate rules. Indeed, we agree
with Stephen Yeazell’s view that the current rulemaking process has become overly cumbersome with little added benefit to
142
the quality of the finished product. Second, some have critiqued its bottom-up approach as overly empowering of the Ad143
visory Committee in lieu of the Supreme Court or Congress.
Third, others conclude that rulemakers, at least of late, are
overly defense biased and unduly focused on the needs of com144
plex litigation to the detriment of the bulk of ordinary cases.
Fourth, still others conclude that, instead of following the empirical data for typical cases, the rulemakers often become
145
wrongly focused on high-profile, atypical cases. Fifth, still
138. See Daniel R. Coquillette, A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking: A Report from the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 685 (1995) (discussing a report prepared by
Thomas E. Baker and Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook).
139. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 (1999)
(defending court-based rulemaking as central to developing and maintaining
rules that reflect principled deliberation).
140. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence, supra note 10,
at 89; Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 10, at
1237–38.
141. See McCabe, supra note 105.
142. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 235 (1998).
143. See, e.g., Paul J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government Work: The
Committee Rulemaking Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69, 72–73 (2010).
144. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking
and Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1595
(2015) (labeling the current members as a “rulemaking committee appointed
by a Republican Chief Justice that is dominated by judges appointed by Republican [P]residents and lawyers who defend corporations/businesses”); Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the
Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1144–52 (2015) (arguing that the appointments to the Advisory Committee by Chief Justice Roberts are biased against plaintiffs); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology
in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 614–23
(2001) (similar).
145. See Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV.
1005, 1042–43 (2016); Suja A. Thomas & Dawson Price, How Atypical Cases
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others note that because the Advisory Committee responds to
the practicing bar, not voters generally, it has an unfortunate
146
tendency toward denying access to the judicial system. Sixth,
some scholars find, akin to an agency capture argument, that
147
the rulemaking process is dominated by corporate interests.
Consider the drafting process leading up to the 2015 Rules
amendments as evidence that there is truth to both the claims
of virtues and vices in the rulemaking process. The 2015
Amendments deal predominantly with pre-trial case manage148
ment, discovery, spoliation, and cooperation among attorneys.
The Advisory Committee had access to a lot of data in this endeavor. For years, the Federal Judicial Center had found that,
at the median, discovery is not overly expensive. It concluded
that, again at the median, discovery cost about 1.6% of the
stakes for plaintiffs and 3.3% of the stakes for defendants in
149
2009 with the median stakes coming in at $160,000. Indeed,
“[n]early every effort to quantify litigation costs and to understand discovery practice over the last four decades has reached
150
results similar to the 2009 FJC study.” Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee, focusing on the approximately five percent of
151
cases that do have explosive discovery costs, and perhaps
driven by biases attributable to the defense-centered elite AdviMake Bad Rules: A Commentary on the Rulemaking Process, 15 NEV. L.J.
1141, 1142 (2015).
146. See Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of
Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 263 (2009).
147. See Coleman, supra note 145, at 1015–19.
148. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rules 1, 4, 16, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 55, and 84 and the Appendix of Forms,
Absent Contrary Congressional Action, 305 F.R.D. 457 (2015) [hereinafter
Proposed Amendments].
149. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 43 (2009); see also Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E.
Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE
L.J. 765, 773–74 (2010) (finding that “[discovery] costs are generally proportionate” to client stakes in the litigation); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal
Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 525, 531 (1998) (finding similar results
just ten years earlier); see also JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA xxvii (1998), http://www.rand.org/pubs/
monograph_reports/2009/MR941.pdf (“Discovery is not a pervasive litigation
cost problem for the majority of cases.”).
150. Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice
Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1111 (2012).
151. Willging et al., supra note 149, at 531.
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152

sory Committee membership, offered an aggressive slate of
153
discovery-limiting amendments in 2013. For example, the
proposed 2013 changes included amendments which would
have lowered the presumptive limits on the use of discovery de154
vices in Rules 30, 31, 33 and 36. In reaction, the bar aggressively deployed the opportunity to participate provided by the
notice-and-comment period. As noted above, nearly 2300 comments, many critical, were submitted after the amendments
155
were proposed. Indeed, these proposed changes were comprehensively addressed by pro-plaintiff groups such as the American Association for Justice, which opposed them in the court of
156
157
public opinion and formally with the Advisory Committee.
Substantial changes to the proposed rules were made as a result. Indeed, the Advisory Committee withdrew all the proposed presumptive limits on Rules 30, 31, 33 and 36, noting
that “[s]uch widespread and forceful opposition deserves re158
spect.” Moreover, many of the other controversial proposed

152. See Coleman, supra note 145, at 1016–19.
153. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY
DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY
AND CIVIL PROCEDURE (2013), http://www.hib.uscourts.gov/news/archives/
attach/preliminary-draft-proposed-amendments.pdf [hereinafter 2013 PROPOSAL]; see also REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app. B-5 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/
ST09-2014.pdf (noting choice to move for proportionality amendments to discovery).
154. See 2013 PROPOSAL, supra note 153, at 300–05, 310–11.
155. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (noting numbers of comments submitted).
156. See, e.g., Arthur Bryant, Access to Justice at Stake with Federal Rules
Changes, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST.: FIGHTING FOR JUST. BLOG (June 5, 2014),
https://www.justice.org/blog/access-justice-stake-federal-rules-changes; Federal Courts Should Not Be Rigged in Favor of Corporations, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST.
(Nov. 7, 2013), https://www.justice.org/news/federal-courts-should-not-be
-rigged-favor-corporations; Proposed Changes to Federal Rules Would Eliminate Access to Justice, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST. (Dec. 20, 2013), https://www
.justice.org/news/proposed-changes-federal-rules-would-eliminate-access
-justice.
157. See Comments on Proposed Rules from J. Burton LeBlanc, President,
Am. Ass’n for Justice, to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Dec.
19, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-RULES-CV-2013
-0002-0372 (download pdf ).
158. See Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting at lines 466–67
(Apr. 10–11, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV04
-2014-min.pdf.
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159

changes were not adopted. Of course, other proposals were
160
adopted, and the jury remains out as to their impact.
Debating the wisdom of the 2015 amendments is not our
goal here. Rather, our point in this brief review of the rulemaking structure, coupled with an overview of its alleged strengths
and weaknesses in practice, is to show that Justice Frankfurter
was correct. The Rules are not statutes. They are crafted differently. The drafters face different lobbying pressures and different procedural hurdles. They succeed, and fail, differently from
statutes. As such, wholesale adoption of a Rules-as-statutes
approach to interpretation, based upon a separation-of-powers
foundation, poorly fits in the context of this particular lawmaking process.
D. A NORMATIVE FOUNDATION FOR CIVIL RULES
INTERPRETATION
We turn now from critique to our positive vision for the
normative foundations of a theory of civil rules interpretation.
While we believe that Rules interpretation is fundamentally
distinct from statutory interpretation for the reasons described
above, that does not mean that federal courts should be allowed
to ignore the text and the ascertainable intent of the
rulemakers. Because the principles of legislative supremacy
and faithful agency are inapplicable, however, we need to provide another theoretical justification for this principle. To this
end, we point out that the Rules are legally authoritative, from
a legal process theory and rule-of-law perspective, once they
have been enacted through the foregoing process, which therefore requires federal courts to follow the identifiable policy
choices of the rulemakers. We believe this more applicable
normative foundation for civil rules interpretation has several
pragmatic consequences as well, which we discuss in Parts II
and III.
We turn first to a primer on legal process theory. This
school of thought aims to promote democratic legitimacy and

159. See Proposed Amendments, supra note 148.
160. Compare Altom M. Maglio, Adapting to Amended Federal Discovery
Rules, TRIAL, July 2015, at 37, 40 (“[T]he actual rule amendments do not support [the] perspective [of severe restrictions on discovery].”), with Andrew J.
Kennedy, Significant Changes to Discovery and Case Management Practices,
AM. ASS’N FOR JUST. (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.justice.org/magazine/trial/
2015-july%E2%80%94drugs-and-devices (claiming that the rule amendments
will cause “a sea change in the scope of discovery”).
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respect for the rule of law by approaching legal regimes as
161
structures for rational decisionmaking. To this end, “[i]ts central principle was that each governmental institution possesses
a distinctive area of competence such that specific tasks can be
assigned to that institution without reference to the substan162
tive policies involved.” As a fundamental matter, then, this
approach looks to process as a way to promote rational
decisionmaking, with a focus upon routing decisions to fora
holding the appropriate institutional advantage in light of the
issue facing the decisionmaker.
Turning to interpretation, Hart and Sacks began with the
premise that all law is purposive in orientation, and that the
role of the judiciary in statutory interpretation is therefore to
ascertain the best means of carrying out the legislature’s purposes. In doing so, however, courts were instructed to avoid results that could not be squared with the statutory text or other
clearly established legal policies, and they should “assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature
was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable pur163
poses reasonably.” This purposive methodology essentially
entailed the following basic steps: “(1) develop an understanding of the purposes or principles of the statute, (2) evaluate alternatives for action in relation to those purposes or principles,
(3) act in ways, other things equal, that best furthers those
purposes or principles, and (4) adopt only interpretations per164
mitted by the statute’s text.” However, when purposive judges were confronted with problems that were likely unanticipated by the legislature, and following the plain meaning of the
text would lead to absurd or severely problematic results, they
would traditionally be willing to consider following the “familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor
165
within the intention of its makers.”
161. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse,
and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (1996); id.
at 1397 (“Legal process theorists accepted the prevailing notion that government institutions act rationally to achieve their goals.”).
162. Id. at 1396.
163. HART & SACKS, supra note 87, at 1378.
164. Stack, supra note 5, at 876 (summarizing the purposive framework for
interpretation that was articulated by Hart and Sacks); see also HART &
SACKS, supra note 87, at 1374–80 (providing their “note on the rudiments of
statutory interpretation”).
165. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
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It is important to understand that while Hart and Sacks
set forth a purposive approach to statutory interpretation that
is consistent with legislative supremacy and the judiciary’s traditional obligation to serve as a faithful agent of the legislature,
The Legal Process was based on a broader jurisprudential theory of the nature of law and therefore has potentially wider ap166
plication. Kevin Stack has recently revisited the theoretical
underpinnings of The Legal Process, and explained that its
“distinctive conception of the rationality of law made [the] theo167
ry an attractive synthesis of formalist and realist thought.”
Unlike formalists, Hart and Sacks “recognized legal
decisionmaking as a creative process,” and, unlike realists, they
“understood law and legal decisionmaking as a rational enterprise” that is “informed by an organic relationship among legal
168
rules, social policies, and ethical principles.” Hart and Sacks
viewed the state as a mechanism to facilitate collective action
that would improve social welfare and thereby promote the
169
common good, and they therefore understood law as “a doing
of something, a purposive activity, a continuous striving to
170
solve the basic problems of social living . . . .” Because people
who live together in a community must have some understanding of how they are expected to behave, those substantive understandings “necessarily imply the existence of what may be
called constitutive or procedural understandings or arrangements about how questions in connection with both types are to
171
be settled.” In other words, law requires procedure, and any
legal system must also establish processes for how those proce172
dures are to be made. Because procedures can be well made
or poorly designed to serve their objectives, Hart and Sacks repeatedly emphasized the importance of institutional competence:

166. See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355,
383–91 (2012) (reconsidering the premises of legal process purposivism and
arguing that this approach should be extended to judicial interpretation of
agency regulations); see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 87, at lxii (describing the vision of law that animated THE LEGAL PROCESS).
167. Stack, supra note 166, at 383.
168. Id. at 383 n.139 (quoting Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 87, at lxiii).
169. See HART & SACKS, supra note 87, at 2–3.
170. Id. at 148.
171. Id. at 3.
172. This is perhaps an observation that only a civil procedure professor
could love.
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In a government seeking to advance the public interest, each organ
has a special competence or expertise, and the key to good government is not just figuring out what is the best policy, but figuring out
which institutions should be making which decisions and how all the
173
institutions should interrelate.

At the end of the day, “[a]n organized society is one which has
an interconnected system of procedures adequate, or claiming
to be adequate, to deal with every kind of question affecting the
group’s internal relations, and every kind of question affecting
its external relations which the group can establish competence
174
to deal with.” In short, Hart and Sacks saw a focus upon routing legal questions to the forum that holds the relevant institutional advantages in relation to the issue presented as key to
their philosophy.
Yet, as Stack points out, contemporary scholarship tends to
equate legal process theory with Hart and Sacks’s famous suggestion that when inferring the purposes of a statute, courts
“should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears,
that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursu175
ing reasonable purposes reasonably,” and to criticize the theory on the grounds that this presumption is unrealistic and
176
shifts too much policymaking discretion to the judiciary. Yet
this caricature of legal process theory ignores the importance
that Hart and Sacks attributed to positive sources for identifying the purposes of statutes, and fails to appreciate how atten177
tion to those sources fits within their broader theory of law.
For starters, Hart and Sacks emphasized that “[a] formally enacted statement of purpose in a statute should be accepted by
the court if it appears to have been designed to serve as a guide
to interpretation, is consistent with the words and context of
the statute, and is relevant to the question of meaning at is178
sue.” Indeed, the legal process school embraces six broad concepts, all of which offer insight: (1) a focus upon institutional
settlement; (2) a purposive approach to judicial decisionmaking; (3) a commitment to rule of law; (4) a commitment to
reasoned elaboration of enduring legal principles; (5) a special
attention to the balancing of neutral principles that transcend
173. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 87, at lx.
174. HART & SACKS, supra note 87, at 4.
175. Id. at 1378.
176. See Stack, supra note 166, at 383.
177. See id.
178. HART & SACKS, supra note 87, at 1377; see also Stack, supra note 166,
at 384–88 (providing a careful description of “the purposive technique”).
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the immediate facts of any particular case; and (6) a focus on
the structural features of the law—such as federalism and sep179
aration of powers in the constitutional context.
This fuller understanding of the legal process school is especially relevant here in light of the significance of the principle of institutional settlement. Hart and Sacks characterized
this notion as “the central idea of law” that underlies every sys180
tem of constitutive procedures. This principle “expresses the
judgment that decisions which are the duly arrived at result of
duly established procedures . . . ought to be accepted as binding
upon the whole society unless and until they are duly
181
changed.” Hart and Sacks claimed that a clear understanding
of the principle of institutional settlement eliminates many of
the “mysteries” of jurisprudence, such as the relationship be182
tween law and morality. When this principle applies, “we say
that the law ‘is’ thus and so, and brush aside further discussion
183
of what it ‘ought’ to be.” Significantly, however, “the ‘is’ is not
really an ‘is’ but a special kind of ‘ought’—a statement that, for
the reasons just reviewed, a decision which is the duly arrived
at result of a duly established procedure for making decisions of
that kind ‘ought’ to be accepted as binding upon the whole soci184
ety unless and until it has been duly changed.”
The key point for present purposes is that legal process
theory’s commitments to seeking institutional advantage in resolving controversies, and according proper respect to duly
promulgated texts and the clear decisions of lawmakers follow
from the nature of law and the principle of institutional settlement, rather than the concept of legislative supremacy. These
commitments, therefore, have potential application in the non185
legislatively crafted Rules context.
Moreover, the proposition that adhering to the duly promulgated decisions of authorized institutions performs an essential coordinating function in a legal system that seeks to “solve

179. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 963–70 (1994).
180. HART & SACKS, supra note 87, at 4; see also Stack, supra note 166, at
389–91 (describing the principle of institutional settlement and explaining its
importance to Hart and Sack’s jurisprudential theory).
181. HART & SACKS, supra note 87, at 4.
182. See id. at 4–5.
183. Id. at 5.
184. Id.
185. See Stack, supra note 166, at 390–91.
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186

the basic problems of social living” provides a remarkably apt
justification for the judiciary’s obligation to follow the clear
mandates of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Adjudication
is, after all, a public institution that seeks to resolve disputes
that arise within a community in a peaceful fashion, and authoritative rules of procedure are plainly necessary for this institution to perform this function. The litigants, judges, and
other participants in adjudication must have adequate guidance regarding how to behave. While the Rules Enabling Act
provides little guidance regarding their preferred content, the
very first Rule provides that “[t]hey should be construed and
administered . . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive de187
termination of every action and proceeding.” Accordingly, we
contend that the first principle of any theory of Rules interpretation should be that the judiciary must follow the principle of
institutional settlement, and that this aspect of the rule of law
requires federal courts to follow the identifiable policy choices
188
of the rulemakers.
***
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require an interpretive theory of their own. Although the federal courts, more often than not, default to a Rules-as-statutes approach, this position is unsound. Every traditional theory of statutory
interpretation takes legislative supremacy as an axiom upon
which the theory is premised as it aims to navigate an
interbranch encounter. Interpretation of the Rules, which are
judicially crafted by contrast, is an intrabranch encounter. As
such, wholesale imposition of statutory interpretive theory to
the Rules lacks a strong normative fit. Following legal process
theory insights, we contend that an interpretive theory for the
Rules better rests upon a foundation of the principles of institutional settlement, institutional advantage, and rule-of-law
norms.
Of course, the heated debates over statutory interpretation
have demonstrated that a rough consensus on first principles
need not preclude substantial methodological disagreement. A
full-fledged theory of Rules interpretation also needs to address
several trickier problems, including (1) how to identify and resolve ambiguities in the Rules; (2) the proper ways to facilitate
186. Id.
187. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
188. We will have more to say about precisely how this should be done later
in the Article. See infra Part III.B.
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any necessary or desirable policy changes in the operation of
the Rules; and (3) whether and how to differentiate the methods that should be followed by the Supreme Court and lower
189
federal courts. The next Part describes the theories of Rules
interpretation that have been suggested in the small body of
scholarly literature on this topic, and explains how they address the relevant problems.
II. SCHOLARLY THEORIES OF RULES INTERPRETATION
While interpretation of the Rules remains woefully underexplored, we are not the first scholars to question the Rules-asstatutes model. We turn to the two leading families of theories
in this part, both of which we find unsatisfying. We begin with
the inherent-authority model, which asserts that the Court’s
engagement with the Rules is more of a common-law-like, freewheeling, policy-setting endeavor than a traditional interpretative task. We reject this position as incompatible with the principle of institutional settlement and rule-of-law norms, given
that the Rules Enabling Act has definitively routed proceduralpolicy questions to the rulemaking process. Second, we address
the regime-specific purposive model. Unlike the inherentauthority model, this view assumes that courts face a traditional interpretive chore in Rules cases, but contends that, unlike statutes, the Rules come with a regime-specific commitment to a purposive, as contrasted with a neo-textualist,
approach to interpretation. While we find much to admire in
this view, we ultimately reject it because it fails to account for
the essential choice-of-policymaking-form question that the Supreme Court routinely faces in Rules cases, and it fails sufficiently to embrace the institutional advantages of court rulemaking in procedural policy setting.
A. INHERENT-AUTHORITY MODEL
Recognizing the descriptive and normative flaws of a
Rules-as-statutes interpretive model, several scholars are
drawn to an unrestrained approach to Rules interpretation.
Judge Karen Nelson Moore gives us the first complete presentation of this inherent-authority view of Rules interpretation.

189. Cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How To
Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (2012) (suggesting
that it may be appropriate for higher and lower courts to follow different interpretive methods based on their different institutional characteristics).
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She contends that the Rules Enabling Act vests the Supreme
Court with “substantial . . . powers . . . in the promulgation
190
process” for the Rules which, when viewed in light of the
Court’s inherent authority to set procedure, counsels for a
“greater power to interpret Rules” than federal courts are tradi191
tionally understood to have when interpreting statutes. As a
result, the plain meaning of a rule’s text need not control; indeed, even the intentions of the drafters should not limit the
192
Court. She posits that the Court should feel free to “reform[ ]
193
the Rules” through interpretation. Accordingly, she asserts
that the Court should look to a rule’s broadly perceived purpose
and consider how this purpose can best be achieved in light of
194
changed conditions.
A related group of scholars go farther still. These commentators contend that the Rules are not fully authoritative at all.
Rather, these thinkers tend to assert that the Rules are mere
195
“rules of thumb.” Further, these commentators often decry
viewing rules as authoritative under the guise that this is but
196
an empty formalism. It is fair to view these scholars as going
even a step further than Moore insofar as they reject the need
to engage in an interpretive act at all, while at the same time
197
placing them within the same interpretive family as Moore.
Members of this school, then, champion the Supreme Court
bringing substantial policy-setting change by way of atextual,
non-stare decisis constrained, Court-determined policy. The
basic idea is that the Court makes the rules, and the Court

190. Moore, supra note 10, at 1093; see also Bauer, supra note 10, at 729
(“Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, . . . Congress has vested all rulemaking
authority in the Supreme Court, subject only to a limited form of potential legislative veto.”).
191. Moore, supra note 10, at 1093.
192. Id. at 1092–94.
193. Id. at 1109.
194. Id. at 1096.
195. See Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1196–97 (1994) (discussing the differences between
“serious rules” and “rules of thumb”).
196. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 373
(2000); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class
Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 351 (discussing the shortcomings of cases
that favor formalism over due process concerns in the context of class actions
and Rule 23).
197. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 941–42 (describing and rejecting this
view).
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should therefore feel free to change the rules based on policy
considerations in a common-law fashion when it decides cases.
The so-called summary judgment trilogy—Matsushita Electric
198
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., Anderson v. Liberty
199
200
Lobby, Inc., and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett —provide a strong
example of this type of interpretative approach. Prior to the
201
trilogy, in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., the Court interpreted
what is now Rule 56(a)’s language in the context of a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 civil rights suit, alleging that the defendant department
store refused to serve the white school-teacher plaintiff and her
minor African-American students at its lunch counter, leading
to an arrest for vagrancy. The lead plaintiff contended that
there was state action, as required by § 1983, because the department store and the local police conspired to prevent service
202
at the lunch counter. The district court granted summary
judgment, reasoning that the plaintiff had failed to show evi203
dence of a conspiracy. Reversing, the Court interpreted “facts
showing” as placing a duty on the defendant, as the moving
204
party, to show affirmatively that no conspiracy took place. “If
the existence of a conspiracy was ‘X,’ the Adickes Court held
that Kress was required to produce affirmative evidence show205
ing ‘not-X’ (that is, that ‘X’ is false).” Thus, for a moving defendant to prevail at summary judgment, the movant must
“show” that it has undisputed evidence countering every possible avenue to a plaintiff victory at trial.
The trilogy cases completely reversed this burden on a
moving defendant, without a substantive change to the relevant text of Rule 56. They did so by placing the burden on the
plaintiff to produce evidence to counter a summary judgment
motion. In the lead Celotex decision, the Court held that Rule
56(e) requires the plaintiff to “designate ‘specific facts showing
206
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” The Court, thus, reinterpreted “facts showing” from a burden on defendants to show
198. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
199. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
200. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
201. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
202. Id. at 148.
203. Id. at 153–55 & nn.8–12.
204. Id. at 158.
205. Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering
Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 81, 94 (2006).
206. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).
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with undisputed facts that plaintiff has no path to victory, to a
burden on plaintiffs to produce sufficient evidence to support
207
their claim at the summary judgment stage. “In other words,
if ‘X’ is a necessary element of the plaintiff’s claim,” under the
trilogy, “the defendant is not required to produce affirmative
evidence showing ‘not-X’; the defendant can also meet its burden by showing that the plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to
208
prove ‘X’ at trial.”
Of special importance here, the Celotex decision is rooted in
a Court-set policy preference of sparing defendants the cost of
209
trial in weak cases. While we believe that this is a legitimate
210
policy, we also believe that it was established by the wrong
body. In this regard, the notion that the Celotex approach,
211
which “impose[s] virtually no burden at all on the movant,”
squares with Rule 56(e)’s requirement that “the movant shows
212
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” is
strained—at best. As Adam Steinman has convincingly argued,
even assuming the Celotex, Court-set goal is a good one, “it fails
213
in terms of the [three] interpretive values” of “(1) consistency
with prior cases; (2) consistency with the text that the decision
214
purports to interpret; and (3) internal coherence.” As such,
the trilogy cases exemplify the “reform the Rules through interpretation” approach, which is the hallmark of the inherent215
216
As discussed above,
this same Courtauthority view.

207. See Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial:
Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1345 (2005); see
also EDWARD J. BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 79–81 (2d ed. 2000).
208. Steinman, supra note 205, at 98.
209. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (“Rule 56 must be construed with due regard
not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also
for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in
the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses
have no factual basis.”).
210. See Redish, supra note 207, at 1343 (“[T]here exists no justification for
imposing any burden on a movant for summary judgment that would not parallel the burden that party would have at trial prior to moving for judgment as
a matter of law.”); see also BRUNET ET AL., supra note 207, at 85 (same).
211. Redish, supra note 207.
212. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
213. Steinman, supra note 205, at 111.
214. Id. at 107.
215. Id. at 109.
216. See supra notes 61–71 and accompanying text (discussing Twombly).

2017]

CIVIL RULES INTERPRETIVE THEORY

2203

derived-policy-over-promulgated-text approach forms the core
of Twombly’s and Iqbal’s reconstruction of Rule 8.
One may instructively draw parallels, even if the fit is not
one-to-one, between Eskridge and Frickey’s dynamic approach
to statutory interpretation and the inherent-authority model of
217
Rules interpretation. From this perspective, the interpreter is
not engaged in a purely historical search for legislative intent
as exemplified by the text nor is the interpreter limited only to
218
a search for the original purposes of the statute. Rather under this view “statutory interpretation involves the present-day
interpreter’s understanding and reconciliation of three different
219
perspectives, no one of which will always control.” These
three perspectives are: (1) the best understanding of the statutory text itself; (2) the original legislative expectations as to the
operation of the statute; and (3) “the subsequent evolution of
the statute and its present context, especially the ways in
which the societal and legal environment of the statute has ma220
terially changed over time.” This inclusion of prong-three and
the evolving nature of the legal regime and its present-day effects, which is the hallmark of the dynamic approach, is more
akin to inherent-authority common-law case synthesis than
221
“traditional” statutory interpretation theories. As such, the
inherent-authority view of Rules interpretation, with its focus
on reform through interpretation, fits well as an expression of
dynamic interpretation in the Rules context.
Just as Eskridge argues that the dynamic theory of statutory interpretation better describes the actual practice of the
222
courts than does an intentionalist or purposive model, one
could well conclude that the inherent-authority model (which
effectively takes an aggressively dynamic approach to Rules interpretation) is also a descriptively superior model—at least for
a portion of the Court’s Rules cases. As Elizabeth Porter, who

217. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 325 (1990);
Eskridge, supra note 78; Eskridge, supra note 103.
218. Eskridge, supra note 103, at 1482 (“Interpretation is not mere exegesis to pinpoint historical meaning, but hermeneutics to apply that meaning to
current problems and circumstances.”).
219. Id. at 1483.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1481 (“[E]xplor[ing] the thesis that statutes, like the Constitution and the common law, should be interpreted dynamically.”).
222. Id. at 1481–82.
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223

endorses the legitimacy of this approach, recently demonstrated, the “Court’s procedural rulings [often eschew traditional statutory construction and] evince a contradictory mode
of interpretation, one that is rooted less in the Rules and more
224
in the Court’s inherent power of adjudication.” In fact, Porter
specifically describes many of the Court’s decisions as exemplifying (if not going even beyond) the dynamic-interpretative ap225
In the “headline” change-in-policy cases—such as
proach.
226
Harris, Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Iqbal —the Court simply has
a different policy preference than the position adopted by the
Advisory Committee or embodied in prior interpretations of the
227
relevant rule. At least when the Court “rules from its common-law hip,” as it does often in Rules cases, this inherentauthority model that finds roots in dynamic interpretive theory
228
has much descriptive power.
Nevertheless, the inherent-authority model is significantly
flawed as a generally applicable theory of Rules interpretation.
To begin with the descriptive fit, a sole focus on the Court’s inherent-authority moments in Rules cases provides a false impression of the Court’s overall approach. Indeed, the Court regularly embraces the Rules-as-statutes paradigm, even in recent
229
years. As we outlined above, we conclude that the Rules-asstatutes approach remains the “blackletter” view from which
230
other approaches deviate. The inherent authority view, thus,
runs contrary to the Aristotelian principle that normative
judgments have a rich descriptive connectivity with the issues
231
being analyzed.
More tellingly, the inherent-authority model fails normatively on legal process-school grounds because the Rules Enabling Act trumps the Court’s inherent authority to establish

223. See Porter, supra note 10, at 175; see also id. at 146–48 (explaining
that the Court’s limited control over the rulemaking process makes it logical to
use adjudication as the mechanism for implementing its own policy views despite the text of a Rule).
224. Id. at 136.
225. Id. at 137.
226. See supra notes 28–31 (citing these cases).
227. See Porter, supra note 10, at 136–41.
228. Id. at 142.
229. Id. at 131–36.
230. See supra notes 40–56 and accompanying text (discussing the
blackletter view).
231. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text (discussing the Aristotelian principle).
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procedure. To be sure, absent congressional action, the Supreme Court has “certain implied powers [that] must necessarily result” to the federal courts “‘from the nature of their institution,’ powers ‘which cannot be dispensed with . . . because they
232
are necessary to the exercise of all others.’” In the absence of
congressional action, the setting of procedure would seem to fall
within the scope of this inherent power. But as the Court has
itself held, “Congress has undoubted power to regulate the
practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that
power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to
make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of
233
the United States.”
Because Congress has so strongly acted here, any attempt
to blot out this clear delegation structure in favor of an unbounded inherent-authority approach to Rules interpretation
runs afoul of institutional-settlement and rule-of-law norms. As
Catherine Struve concludes, “[T]he prior existence of inherent
judicial authority concerning a particular matter . . . [of procedure] should, in any event, be irrelevant to the Court’s inter234
pretation of a Rule governing the matter.” Indeed, all agree
that the Rules Enabling Act is delegated rulemaking authority
235
from Congress—not a codification of inherent court power.
The Rules Enabling Act, furthermore, contemplates that major
policy changes to the rules should be accomplished pursuant to
236
the rulemaking process. Moreover, the committee process and
notice-and-comment procedures that limit the Court’s ability to
dictate the precise content of the rules have been required by
Congress since 1988. The Court has not possessed a fullthroated, non-statutorily constrained license to control civil
237
procedure by way of inherent authority since at least 1872.
Any suggestion that the Court is free to ignore the force of the
232. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 21, 23, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812)).
233. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941) (footnote omitted).
234. Struve, supra note 10, at 1131.
235. Id. at 1125; see also Porter, supra note 10, at 175.
236. See Struve, supra note 10, at 1130 (“Accordingly, since the Enabling
Act conditions the delegation of rulemaking power on the Court’s use of the
prescribed procedures, it appears to require the Court to resort to those procedures when seeking to change a Rule.”); see also Marcus, supra note 10, at
933–36 (agreeing that the terms of the Rules Enabling Act are best understood
to counsel interpretive restraint, but recognizing the limitations of a formal
approach and the need for institutional analysis in this context).
237. See Charles E. Clark & James W. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: The Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 392 (1935).
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Rules, absent referral to the Advisory Committee, simply fails
238
to acknowledge the commands of the Rules Enabling Act. A
viable theory of Rules interpretation should therefore recognize
that the Court’s delegated authority to make novel procedural
policy in areas covered by the Rules is contingent on following
239
the congressionally mandated rulemaking procedures.
Despite the clear statutory commitment to procedural rule
creation via the Rules Enabling Act process, adherents of the
inherent-authority model conclude that given the constraints
that the Act imposes on the Court, “it is logical that the Court
would use its most powerful tool—adjudication—to contribute
240
its voice to the agenda and process.” To suggest that the dictates of the Rules Enabling Act do not constrain the Court in
Rules interpretation, however, is to reject the principle of institutional settlement. Application of this principle—“that decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly established
241
procedures . . . ought to be accepted as binding” —in this context is clear. Congress has duly established a process for promulgating rules of procedure. A basic commitment to institutional settlement, then, requires the Court to follow it. The
242
inherent-authority model rejects the notion outright. For similar reasons, the wholesale rejection of the Rules Enabling Act
process in lieu of an unconstrained power to enact procedural
243
policy pursuant to adjudication fails on rule-of-law grounds.
Given our primary thesis, it is important to emphasize that
our claim is that dynamic statutory interpretation is unnecessary and inappropriate in this context, even if this approach is
244
necessary or desirable in statutory interpretation. Dynamic
238. See supra note 223 (citing to Porter’s conclusion that it is both legitimate and logical for the Court to set policy as an adjudicator).
239. We are not claiming, however, that dynamic interpretations of the
Rules are ultra vires. Rather, our claim is that the Rules Enabling Act structure should be incorporated into the prevailing theories of Rules interpretation
as a normative matter, and that this approach can be operationalized. Cf. Mulligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence, supra note 10, at 75 (explaining
that our proposed model “is one premised on institutional competencies, not
authority”).
240. Porter, supra note 10, at 147.
241. HART & SACKS, supra note 87, at 4.
242. See Porter, supra note 10, at 170 (recognizing the legitimacy of the inherent-authority model).
243. Cf. Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103
YALE L.J. 1561, 1568–69 (1994) (arguing that the rule of law mandates some
level of fidelity to authoritatively enacted statutory law).
244. Cf. Glen Staszewski, Statutory Interpretation as Contestatory Democ-
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interpretation has a tendency to infuse statutes with equity
when the most straightforward reading of the text could lead to
injustice or results that are contrary to contemporary public
norms. This approach is unnecessary in Rules interpretation
because many rules incorporate equitable standards that specifically contemplate that lower courts will exercise their dis245
cretion to achieve the best results in each particular case.
Dynamic interpretation is also premised on recognition that
Congress does not, and probably cannot realistically, keep
many statutes up to date, and courts are relatively wellpositioned to update statutory policy when necessary to reach
normatively desirable results in the cases they confront during
adjudication. This approach is inappropriate in the context of
Rules interpretation because there is a dedicated and focused
cadre of rulemakers who are specifically charged with continuously keeping the rules up to date, and this process can realistically be initiated by the Court with mechanisms that would
246
allow rule changes to be applied to pending cases.
Moreover, we believe that advocates of the inherent authority model have been led astray by their tendency to equate
any attempt to take the text of the Rules seriously with a rigid
247
form of neo-textualism. This tendency is perfectly understandable, given that Moore and Bauer were both writing at
the dawn of the new textualism, and they perceptively identified and criticized a discernible trend by the Court to apply this
methodology of statutory interpretation to Rules interpreta248
tion. Meanwhile, Porter is part of a new generation who has
come of age in an era when the most important lessons of
textualism have been assimilated into the thinking of mainstream judges and scholars, and where it is commonplace for
even staunch critics of this theory to acknowledge that “we are
249
all textualists now.” It is therefore not especially surprising
racy, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 245–49 (2013) (advocating “practical reasoning” in statutory interpretation).
245. See infra notes 253–69 and accompanying text.
246. See infra notes 306–15 and accompanying text (describing our proposed “referencing” procedure).
247. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 10, at 171 (linking a textual commitment
in Rules interpretation with Scalia-like “brittle textualism”).
248. Indeed, the Court continues to apply textualism at times in Rules cases, as illustrated by Pavelic & LeFlore, Unitherm Food Systems, Shady Grove,
and scores of other cases. See supra notes 40–56 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
249. See Molot, supra note 6, at 36 n.157 (quoting Jonathan R. Siegel,
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when Porter contends that a text-based interpretive approach
to the Rules is at odds with their “equitable roots,” and that
this approach tends “toward becoming hypertechnical and
250
harsh” and thereby wrongly limits lower-court discretion. By
contrast, in her view, the inherent authority approach, or what
she labels “managerial interpretations,” are characteristically
251
“imbued with a sense of flexibility and fairness.”
In reality, however, an interpretive approach to the Rules
that looks to text as constraining often leads to a discretionary
252
standard for lower courts. When lower courts are plainly authorized to exercise equitable discretion in implementing the
Rules, there is little need for the federal judiciary to engage in
“dynamic statutory interpretation.” The Court may, however,
properly add flesh to the bones of those discretionary standards
or provide guidance regarding their outer parameters in appropriate cases by employing traditional tools of construction, or
what we are calling “jurisprudential purposivism.”
It is crucial to recall that the Rules aim to meld together
law and equity practice as well as to codify many older common
253
law practices that emerged from these separate systems. It
should be no surprise, then, that as a matter of straightforward
interpretation, many of the Rules themselves call for lower254
court discretion. As we have previously argued, our proposed
model of civil rules interpretation embraces these lower-court-,
equity-, and discretionary-focused Rules. Our view is therefore
compatible with the use of intentionalist and purposive tools of
construction that predominated shortly after the Rules were
promulgated, and continue to form the core of statutory inter255
pretation for many scholars and judges.
Simply put, the respectful treatment of text in Rules interpretation does not inevitably lead to a neo-textualist approach
for the Rules any more than it does for statutes. For example, it
Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023,
1057 (1998)).
250. See Porter, supra note 10, at 175.
251. Id.
252. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence, supra note 10,
at 70–73.
253. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2; see also Clark & Moore, supra note 237, at 393.
254. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note
10, at 1227.
255. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 85 (2005) (contrasting “a
literal text-based approach with an approach that places more emphasis on
statutory purpose”).
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is by no means radical to recall that in the Court’s view,
“[a]nalysis of legislative history is, of course, a traditional tool
of statutory construction. There is no reason why we must confine ourselves to, or begin our analysis with, the statutory text
if other tools of statutory construction provide better evidence
of congressional intent with respect to the precise point at is256
sue.” Thus, the issue “in any problem of statutory construc257
tion . . . is the intention of the enacting body,” not necessarily
the plain meaning of the text unadorned by the drafters’ purposes or the like.
Following this view, then, a drafting body, be it Congress
or the Advisory Committee, may use equitable or discretionary
terms without rendering an assessment of the parameters of
those terms beyond the scope of traditional tools of statutory
construction, as proponents of the inherent authority approach
258
suggest. For example, the Court has explained that even
though “Congress included no explicit criteria for equitable
subordination when it enacted § 510(c)(1) [of the Bankruptcy
Code], the reference in § 510(c) to ‘principles of equitable subordination’ clearly indicates congressional intent at least to
start with existing doctrine,” and interpretation of equitable
subordination under § 510(c), which calls for much lower-court
discretion, is amenable to the “principles of statutory construc259
tion.” Indeed, the fact that a drafting body uses language
such as “public interest, convenience, or necessity” to express a
policy to be applied within a set of “complicated factors for
judgment” does not necessarily render the provision beyond the
scope of statutory construction, at least with respect to the out260
er parameters of those terms.
We see these principles at play in the Rules as well. Thus,
for example, Rule 23 properly grants district courts broad discretion, yet appellate review may delimit the boundaries of this
261
discretion. Moreover, as we illustrate below with the example

256. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 106 (2007)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote and citations omitted).
257. United States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50, 53 (1942).
258. See, e.g., United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957) (“[W]here a
. . . statute uses a common-law term of established meaning without otherwise
defining it, the general practice is to give that term its common-law meaning.”).
259. United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 539–40 (1996).
260. FCC v. RCA Commc’ns, 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953).
261. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100–01 (1981).
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262

of Rule 15, the Supreme Court’s crafting of more precise
standards for a Rules’ term such as “as justice requires” is consistent with deploying traditional tools of construction when
the Court’s interpretation is furthering the purpose or intent of
the drafters.
Furthermore, despite contrary assertions by proponents of
263
the inherent-authority camp, not all text-focused constructions of the Rules call for a rigid, non-flexible, “the rule of law
264
as a law of rules” approach that privileges appellate authority
over lower-court discretion. A text-focused approach to Rule
11(c)(1), for example, clearly illustrates that sanctions are dis265
cretionary. And this is but one example. Indeed, the Committee Notes to the 2007 amendments clearly state that the drafters often intend lower-court discretion; moreover, this
discretionary approach can be invoked by way of standard textfocused interpretation whenever the drafters use the term
266
“may.” Simply put, a textual commitment to Rules interpretation often leads to lower-court discretion.
It appears, then, that proponents of the inherent-authority
model have thrown the baby out with the bath water. By erroneously conflating any commitment to text with “brittle
267
textualism,” they are drawn to an unconstrained theory of
Rules interpretation as the only alternative. This unbounded
approach, however, ignores the dictates of the Rules Enabling
Act—full stop! Such a view cannot be squared with the concept
of institutional settlement.
By rejecting this inherent-authority approach, however, we
do not embrace a naïve faith in the Rule drafters’ ability to
craft perfect regimes. We entirely agree that there are characteristic problems with rules based on their imprecision and the
268
limited foresight of lawmakers. Rules are therefore frequent262. See infra notes 291–95 and accompanying text.
263. See Porter, supra note 10, at 175.
264. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175 (1989).
265. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (“[T]he court may impose an appropriate sanction . . . .”).
266. FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 2007 Advisory Commitee Notes (“The restyled rules
replace ‘shall’ with ‘must,’ ‘may,’ or ‘should,’ depending on which one the context and established interpretation make correct in each rule . . . . ‘The court
in its discretion may’ becomes ‘the court may.’”).
267. See Porter, supra note 10, at 175.
268. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953
(1995).
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ly ambiguous as applied to the facts of a particular case, and
even when they have a seemingly plain meaning, rules can lead
to absurd results that were not contemplated or intended when
269
they were adopted by drafters.
As such, we do not advocate for a position that is against
all adjudication-driven interpretation of the Rules. Such adjudication is frequently necessary to resolve the ambiguities of
270
legal rules. Moreover, the promulgation of procedural policy
though adjudication could potentially avoid the problems with
rules in the first place because case-by-case decisionmaking is
more flexible, dynamic, and incremental than rulemaking, in
addition to being cheaper and easier to utilize in some circum271
stances. For these reasons, administrative law, among other
areas, contains several doctrines that allow administrators to
exercise equitable discretion and soften the hard edges of
272
bright-line rules in particular cases. It is also widely understood that even if administrative agencies use rulemaking to
make most of their law and policy, they will inevitably need to
273
conduct a certain amount of “residual adjudication.” None of
these points, however, compel one to reject any and all textually constrained Rules interpretations. As explained below, however, they should counsel careful attention to the respective
roles of lower and higher courts in Rules interpretation, as well
as recognition of the preeminent position of the Advisory Committee in crafting novel procedural policy.
B. REGIME-SPECIFIC PURPOSIVE MODEL
The other leading scholarly approach resides with those
who conclude that the Rules must be interpreted, systematically, in light of the drafters’ intent. These scholars, while recognizing that the Court in interpreting the Rules does not face
274
the same task as it does when interpreting a statute, never269. See Manning, supra note 89, at 2388; Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001 (2006) (providing a theoretical defense of the absurdity doctrine in statutory interpretation based on civic republican theory).
270. See MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 195 (3d ed. 2009).
271. See id. at 194–95 (describing the advantages of adjudication).
272. See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of
Exceptions to Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277; Cass R. Sunstein,
Avoiding Absurdity? A New Canon in Regulatory Law, 32 ENVTL. L. REP.
11126 (2002).
273. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 270.
274. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 929 (recognizing that the principal-

2212

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:2167

theless argue that taking a traditional statutory-construction275
like approach to Rules interpretation is best. These scholars,
most notably Catherine Struve and David Marcus, argue that
the structure of delegated authority under the Rules Enabling
Act, as well as the normative considerations that flow from notice-and-comment rulemaking, necessarily constrain the Court.
They follow the dictate that the “Rule must . . . be applied if it
represents a valid exercise of Congress’s rulemaking authority,
which originates in the Constitution and has been bestowed on
276
this Court by the Rules Enabling Act,” leaving open the interpretive question of what precisely any individual rule commands. These scholars, thus, differ from the inherent-authority
camp insofar as they insist that the Court faces bounded choices when engaging with the Rules, and the Rules thus serve as a
meaningful constraint.
Recognizing that Rules cases present standard interpretive
questions, both Struve and Marcus, contrary to the Court’s
tendency toward a strict textualist approach to Rules interpretation in its Rules-as-statutes cases, reject a neo-textualist perspective. This rejection follows from the unique normative
starting point at play in Rules cases; namely, that the Court is
not faced with an issue of legislative supremacy but is interpreting the work product of the judiciary itself.
As such, Struve argues that even if one is otherwise a
textualist as to statutes, in the Rules context one should look to
purpose and intent as lodged in the Advisory Committee’s Offi277
cial Notes in the interpretive analysis. This position appears
even stronger given that the Rules Enabling Act after the 1988
agent metaphor that grounds much of the statutory construction debate is not
applicable in Rules cases).
275. See id. (“[A]s a functional matter, a court should pursue the same interpretive goal for the Federal Rules that the faithful agent concept recommends for courts as they interpret statutes.”); Struve, supra note 10, at 1141
(“Both the structure of the Enabling Act and the actual rulemaking process,
then, counsel restraint in the interpretation of the Rules: the Court should not
reject authoritative sources of meaning in favor of its own policy conception of
a desirable Rule.”).
276. Burlington N.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987).
277. See Struve, supra note 10, at 1103 (“[T]he Court should accord the
Notes authoritative effect.”); id. at 1158 (“The fact that the Notes proceed
through the approval process along with the text also helps to meet textualist
objections to their use.”); cf. Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textualism, 65 DUKE
L.J. 81 (2015) (claiming that a textualist approach to interpreting administrative regulations should include consideration of the regulatory preamble and
other mandatorily created materials that were part of the public record when
elected officials reviewed and approved the proposal).
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amendments mandates both the creation of these notes and
that these notes be promulgated contemporaneously with the
278
text of the Rules. These mandates create a different interpretive setting than most federal statutes, given that federal statutes seldom come with interpretive instructions or extensive,
279
official lawmaking records. Marcus refines this position ex280
plicitly to adopt a traditional purposive or intentionalist ap281
proach.
Their proposed approach is not entirely unprecedented.
Similar regime-specific, purposive-approach arguments have
been made regarding interpretation of the Uniform Commercial
282
Code (UCC), for example. The UCC, like the Rules, lists its
283
purposes and instructs courts to follow a purposive method of
284
interpretation. Additionally, “the drafters provided a fuller
278. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (2012). Specifically, this section requires that “[i]n
making a recommendation under this section or under section 2072 or 2075,
the body making that recommendation shall provide a proposed rule, an explanatory note on the rule, and a written report explaining the body’s action,
including any minority or other separate views.” Id.
279. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative
State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 570 (1985) (“Congress seldom provides explicit
guidance, even in legislative history, on how it wishes courts to interpret statutory language.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 890 n.13 (2003) (“[P]ast history
shows that it is most unlikely that Congress will enact rules of interpretation
that will generally resolve the disputed issues of interpretive choice.”). While
some scholars have argued that mandatory interpretive rules pose substantial
problems in statutory interpretation, see Staszewski, supra note 91, not all
share this view. See, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002) (arguing that Congress has the constitutional power to mandate tools for interpreting federal
statutes and that it would be wise to exercise that power). In any event, in this
paper, we need not take a stand on this statutory question. Rather, our focus
is on the unique setting of interpretation of the Rules which are promulgated,
unlike statutes, with explanatory comments and statements of purpose.
280. We realize many distinguish these views, but in the Rules context
they are often collapsed.
281. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 957.
282. See Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
795, 797 (1978).
283. U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. COMM’N 2001) (“[U]nderlying
purposes and policies [of this Act] are: (1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize
the law governing commercial transactions; (2) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; and (3) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.”).
284. Id. official cmt. (“The text of each section should be read in the light of
the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, and also of [the Act]
as a whole, and the application of the language should be construed narrowly
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delineation of purpose in the Official Comments to individual
285
[UCC] sections.” As a result “of the way in which the Code
was constructed,” scholars conclude, “[UCC] litigation is a special arena . . . [that requires] purposive interpretation of the
286
Code.” In just the same way, the Rules, in Rule 1, lay out a
purpose, “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
287
every action.” And, as with the UCC, the Rules state that
“[t]hey should be construed and administered” to further this
288
purpose. Finally, as with the UCC, the Rules are accompanied with official comments that offer much in the way of disclosing the drafters’ intent and purpose. Thus, the potential
application of a regime-specific purposive approach in the context of a unique legal regime is not without precedent. Rather,
it presents as a context-sensitive take upon the interpretive
289
question.
Further, as the name implies, the regime-specific purposive approach to the Rules shares much with statutory purposive approaches. Purposive approaches to statutory interpretation are often seen as flowing from the legal process movement,
290
which we also find key to interpretation of the Rules. Struve
and Marcus’s approach, which looks to similar goals of the
Rules drafters and seeks to further those ends in similar ways,
fits solidly in this family of thought.
291
As we have previously argued, when not facing policychange cases, we applaud the Court for taking a text-focused
interpretive approach that embraces purposive reasoning. In
292
Foman v. Davis, for example, the Court addressed when a
district court could decline a motion for leave to amend a pleading when the text of Rule 15 was not self-defining, although the
intent of the drafters was sufficiently clear. The Court ap-

or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies
involved.”).
285. McDonnell, supra note 282, at 800.
286. Id. at 801.
287. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
288. Id.
289. Cf. Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of
Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 817 (2002) (arguing that as a
matter of statutory interpretation, courts should consider the legal context in
which Congress enacts a statute).
290. See supra Part I.D.
291. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note
10, at 1227.
292. 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
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proached the question of defining Rule 15’s then-drafted language—“leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so
293
requires’” —by deploying a text-focused-interpretive strategy.
The Court thus read Rule 15 as a part of the Rules as a
294
whole. The Court, in this manner, interpreted the leave-toamend provision in Rule 15 vis-à-vis the general goals of Rule 1
and the pleading standards established by Rule 8(a)(2), as then
envisioned by Conley, and delineated several standards, such
as futility or bad faith, for when an amendment should not be
295
allowed.
We admire much in the regime-specific purposive model
and think that this approach would generally work in the lower
federal courts. This view is not ultimately satisfying, however,
as the primary approach to civil rules interpretation for the
Supreme Court. Most importantly, this view fails to account for
the unique choice-of-policymaking-form question the Court faces with Rules issues. While noting that the Rules lack a separation-of-powers component that drives much of statutory construction, which negates any prima facie attraction to a
textualist approach, proponents of the regime-specific purposive view continue to perceive Rules cases basically the same as
296
if they involved statutes. Following this approach, proponents
of the model contend that the Court has an obligation to inter297
pret the Rules, as it would with a statute.
The Court, however, just like an administrative agency,
faces a choice of policymaking form that it does not face in
statutory cases. Most statutes that delegate authority to agencies to promulgate orders and rules leave it up to the agency to
decide whether to make policy pursuant to rulemaking or adjudication. Agencies can therefore routinely choose whether to
make policy decisions pursuant to rulemaking or adjudication.
This decision is known in administrative law as an agency’s

293. Id. at 182 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)).
294. Id.; see also Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469,
477–78 (1992) (stating that the plainness or ambiguity of statutory language
is determined by reference to, among other things, the broader context of the
statute as a whole).
295. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.
296. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
297. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 942 (“Relationships among the various
institutions involved in rule promulgation and interpretation—the Supreme
Court, the lower federal courts, rulemaking committees, and Congress—and
the values that these relationships create support an obligation to interpret.”).
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298

“choice of policymaking form.” Since it is widely recognized
that administrative agencies can make policy decisions through
rulemaking or adjudication, an agency’s choice of policymaking
form has received a great deal of attention in administrative
law scholarship. This literature recognizes the “obvious point”
that “the agency makes an important choice when it selects the
299
policymaking form its actions will take.” An agency’s choice of
policymaking form is important because rulemaking and adjudication have distinctive advantages and drawbacks as policymaking vehicles.
300
The Court faces just such a choice in Rules cases, which
weighs against full-fledged adoption of the regime-specific purposive model. First, the certiorari question itself is best viewed
301
as a question of policymaking form. Cases involving the application of equitable standards are best resolved initially—
and, for the most part exclusively—in the lower federal
302
courts. This includes cases that require the lower courts to
apply an equitable or discretionary standard to the facts of a
particular case, which do not ordinarily require any high-court
review as the Court does not function as an error-correction in303
stitution—a role better played by the courts of appeals. As
such, typically it is best if the Court, in an act of policymaking
form choice, dispenses with such review altogether—excepting
those cases where a circuit split (or other indicia of certworthiness) would require taking up the matter. Indeed, the
298. See Magill, supra note 38.
299. Id. at 1397.
300. Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 10,
at 1205.
301. The Court sets its own agenda when it grants or denies certiorari. See
H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 221–22 (1991) (“Fundamentally, the definition of
‘certworthy’ is tautological: a case is certworthy because four justices say it is
certworthy. . . . [C]ertworthiness is ultimately subjective, changing, and undefinable . . . .”); Sanford Levinson, Strategy, Jurisprudence, and Certiorari, 79
VA. L. REV. 717, 736 (1993) (reviewing PERRY, JR., supra) (“[I]t seems difficult
indeed to read the Court’s own Rule 10 as anything other than an invitation to
balancing, to the making of ‘political choice(s)’ about what is ‘important’
enough to demand the overt, highly visible intervention of the United States
Supreme Court.”); see also Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 10, at 1234.
302. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence, supra note 10,
at 82.
303. Cf. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME
COURT’S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1986).
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percolation of such issues in the lower courts will often yield
consensus, in which case Supreme Court intervention will typi304
cally be unnecessary. There will, however, undoubtedly be
situations in which lower courts with a plurality of perspectives
regarding the best manner of managing federal litigation will
disagree about the proper resolution of an issue, in which case
the Court may eventually want or need to intervene. This is especially so in cases where the party seeking certiorari is also
seeking a procedural reform, as the denial of a grant for such a
305
party constitutes a loss. But what is key is that interpretation by the Court is not an obligation—it is a choice.
Of course the certiorari power is not unique to Rules cases.
What is unique to Rules cases is the further choice-ofpolicymaking-form option of resolution of Rules issues by the
Advisory Committee. We have discussed in prior work the process by which the Court can effectively refer matters to the Ad306
visory Committee after granting certiorari, and the streamlining of this process that could occur with the introduction of
307
modest reforms. Even without statutory amendments, the
Court could refer questions to the Advisory Committee by
308
amendment to its own Supreme Court Rules. Thus, using the
criteria the Justices might otherwise deploy for determining
309
the Court could determine
whether to grant certiorari,
whether a particular Rules case merits high court review. At
this stage, assuming the issue is “certworthy,” the Court could
accomplish such a reference to the Advisory Committee by
summarily granting the writ of certiorari, vacating the lower
court opinion, remanding the case, and ordering a stay pending
310
action by the Advisory Committee. Such a move would, in ef304. See Ronald J. Krotozynski, Jr., The Unitary Executive and the Plural
Judiciary: On the Potential Virtues of Decentralized Judicial Power, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1021, 1053 (2014) (describing the premium that the federal judicial system places “on disparate decision makers all reaching the same conclusion” in the lower courts).
305. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note
10, at 1234–35.
306. See id. at 1235–37.
307. See id. at 1237–40.
308. See id. at 1236.
309. See generally Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray,
Strategy in Supreme Court Case Selection: The Relationship Between Certiorari and the Merits, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 7–16 (2008) (reviewing the papers of retired Justices to determine what criteria the Justices employ in case selection).
310. See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 345–49
(9th ed. 2007) (discussing the Supreme Court’s GVR practice).
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fect, operate like a certification of a question from a court to an
311
312
agency or from a federal court to a state court, insofar as
the lower court is merely to await resolution of the question.
Should a rule revision result from this process, the new rule
would apply to the case in the court of appeals after the stay is
lifted. Indeed, Rules revisions are regularly applicable to cases
313
pending on appeal without retroactivity concerns. Further,
this referencing approach follows administrative practice that
recognizes that agencies have the discretion to stay adjudica314
tions to await the resolution of a rulemaking, as well as judicial practice recognizing that courts have the discretion to stay
315
proceedings to await the resolution of a rulemaking. Moreover, given that there is no constitutional right to an appeal in
316
317
civil cases, nor a statutory right (in most cases) to Supreme
Court review at all, the Court’s choice of a notice-and-comment

311. Cf. Verity Winship, Cooperative Interbranch Federalism: Certification
of State-Law Questions by Federal Agencies, 63 VAND. L. REV. 181, 197 (2010)
(advocating for the expansion of certified questions from federal agencies to
state courts).
312. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing certification from federal to state
courts).
313. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D.
401 (Apr. 22, 1993) (providing an effective date for newly adopted amendments
and directing that they “shall govern . . . insofar as just and practicable, all
proceedings in civil cases then pending”). As such, revised rules apply on appeal, even if the district court relied upon the pre-amended rule in its ruling.
See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1098 (3d
Cir. 1995) (applying revised Rule 4(m) on appeal when the district court relied
upon the pre-amended rule); see also Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to
Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 50–52 (2007) (arguing that congressional modification of civil statutes upon certification of a question from the Supreme
Court would not run contrary to retroactivity prohibitions).
314. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 2.802(d) (2015) (providing that a petitioner who
has filed a petition for rulemaking “may request the Commission to suspend
all or any part of any licensing proceeding to which the petitioner is a participant pending disposition of the petition for rulemaking”); In re Tenn. Valley
Auth. (Bellefonte Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 and 4), 68 N.R.C. 361, 430
(2008) (recognizing that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had the discretion to stay an adjudication until the parties could complete a rulemaking but
declining to exercise that discretion), rev’d on other grounds, 69 N.R.C. (2009).
315. See DAVID F. HERR ET AL., MOTION PRACTICE § 10.07[B] (5th ed.
2010).
316. See Nat’l Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37,
43 (1954).
317. The only mandatory appeal to the Court now comes from three-judge
district court panels. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2015). All other appellate review is
done by writ of certiorari. See id. §§ 1254, 1257.
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venue as opposed to an adjudicatory one would not constitute a
due-process injury to the parties. As such, every Rules case, in
a rich sense, is best understood as a matter of choice by the
Court—not obligation.
The Marcus and Struve model fails to account for this feature of Rules cases and, as a result, fails to account for the advantages that flow from notice-and-comment rulemaking in
318
Rules cases. Moreover, neglecting the issue of policymaking
form runs contrary to the legal process theory’s focus upon institutional advantage as a key to constructing a well-run legal
319
system. Having explored the advantages of civil rules rulemaking over Supreme Court adjudication in the past, we concluded that there are at least four broad institutional advantages to rulemaking over adjudication in policy-change
320
cases. First, rulemaking, as opposed to adjudication, is widely
viewed as a better procedure for making policy and exploring
issues of legislative fact precisely because informal rulemaking
321
procedures are specifically designed for this purpose. Second,
322
anyone who is interested can participate in rulemaking,
while adjudication is generally limited to the parties in a
323
case. Third, the rulemaking method of making policy gives
agencies greater control over their own agendas, allowing them
to set priorities more easily and to implement their program324
matic responsibilities rationally and comprehensively.
318. See infra notes 322–26 and accompanying text.
319. See supra Part I.D (discussing legal process theory).
320. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note
10, at 1207–12.
321. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 270, at 193 (“[T]he procedures of
rulemaking have been designed for the precise purpose of exploring issues of
law, policy, and legislative fact.”); see also 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.8, at 369 (4th ed. 2002) (claiming that for this reason, the product of rulemaking “almost certainly will be instrumentally superior to any ‘rule’ produced by the process of adjudicating a specific dispute”).
322. See David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in
the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 940 (1965)
(recognizing that rulemaking is generally more accessible than adjudication).
323. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 270, at 192–93; PIERCE, supra note
321, § 6.8, at 368–69.
324. ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 270, at 193–94; Ronald A. Cass, Models
of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REV. 363, 394 (1986) (explaining that adjudication is generally understood to represent “a commitment to incremental
resolution of problems,” while rulemaking “entails the comprehensive disposition of a large number of related claims”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2004) (recognizing
that “[a]lmost every law tackles multiple problems at once,” and that in con-
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Fourth, rulemaking is also widely understood to be fairer than
adjudication to groups who are adversely affected by agency action, because newly established rules are prospective instead of
retrospective and can be crafted to afford exceptions and the
325
like.
We do not believe notice-and-comment rulemaking a panacea, however. Rather, our point is that the overwhelming consensus in administrative law is that rulemaking is generally
superior to adjudication as the form for setting policy—warts
326
and all. Moreover, as we have detailed before, these advantages of rulemaking generally apply to the court rulemak327
ing process. Both the inherent-authority and regime-specific
purposive models forego these advantages in policy-change cas328
es, which comes at substantial loss.
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL OF CIVIL RULES
INTERPRETATION
We have, thus far, rejected the Court’s typical Rules-asstatutes approach, with its separation-of-powers starting point,
as inapposite for judiciary-drafted rules. We have also discarded the inherent-authority approach as contrary to the principle
of institutional settlement in light of the Rules Enabling Act.
We also cast-off the regime-specific purposive model for failing
to account for the essential choice-of-policymaking-form question faced by the Court in Rules cases. In this section, then, we
aim to sketch a positive case for the administrative agency
model we espouse as the best interpretive theory for Rules cases. In renewing and refining our prior position on this score, we
trast to adjudication, “agencies can and do make multi-dimensional decisions”
when they promulgate rules).
325. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 321, § 6.8, at 372–74 (“The primary purposes of rules are to effect [sic] future conduct.”); Sunstein, supra note 268, at
974 (recognizing that rules have a tendency to reduce “bias, favoritism, or discrimination in the minds of people who decide particular cases”).
326. See PIERCE, supra note 321, § 6.8, at 368 (“Over the years, commentators, judges, and Justices have shown near unanimity in extolling the virtues
of the rulemaking process over the process of making ‘rules’ through case-bycase adjudication.”); see also Magill, supra note 38, at 1403 n.69, 1415 n.112
(reviewing the formative literature on this topic and reporting that “the bottom line” was that “agencies should rely on rulemaking much more often” than
adjudication).
327. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note
10, at 1206–15.
328. Id. at 1240–51 (discussing the benefits of the rulemaking approach,
including benefits to “the democratic legitimacy of lawmaking”).
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first discuss our preference for rulemaking over adjudication in
policy-change cases. Second, we address the proper role for the
Court as an adjudicator when presented with Rules issues resolvable by traditional tools of purposive construction. Finally,
we respond to some administrative law-inspired objections to
our proposal, and explain why we believe that our model would
result in a sound regulatory regime.
A. PREFERENCE FOR RULEMAKING IN POLICY MATTERS
We begin with our contention that in policy-setting matters, Rules issues should be resolved by the Advisory Committee. Key to this conclusion is that the Court acts as an administrative agency in relation to the Rules, as we have argued
329
extensively in prior work:
330

While the analogy is not seamless, four key features demonstrate
the similarity between administrative agencies and the Court in the
civil procedure context, [which we believe noteworthy in interpreting
the Federal Rules]. First, both agencies and the Court [in Rules matters] have delegated authority to make policy in their respective fields
331
through orders entered in adjudication. Second, both agencies and
the Court [in Rules matters] have delegated authority to make policy
332
through notice-and-comment rulemaking. Third, because the law
does not typically compel these institutions to make policy through a
particular procedural vehicle, both agencies and the Court [in Rules
333
cases] routinely confront choice-of-policymaking-form decisions.
Fourth, the historical parallels, and accompanying ideas of legitimacy, between agency rulemaking and court rulemaking strengthen our
thesis that the Court functions as an administrative agency in the
334
field of civil procedure.

Following this administrative agency analogy, our model
argues that the Court should implement or interpret the Rules
as an agency would if it were following the widely accepted best

329. Id. at 1194–1205. Even our critics tend to agree with us on this point.
See Porter, supra note 10, at 129–30 (recognizing that “recently other scholars
have also analogized the Court to an agency, in order to demonstrate that the
Court is insufficiently deferential to the rulemaking process,” and claiming
that “the Rules much more closely resemble agency regulations” than statutes).
330. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note
10, at 1205, 1205 n.98 (discussing the relevant differences).
331. See id. at 1205.
332. See Burbank, supra note 106, at 1025 (describing the Rules Enabling
Act as a “delegation” of legislative power).
333. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note
10, at 1205.
334. Id.
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335

practices on this topic. This administrative law analogy rests
upon the Court’s choice of policymaking form—not the Court’s
336
mere policy-setting function—as the core issue. Following
this model, the Court, just as an agency would, should direct
policy-change issues to the Advisory Committee for resolution
337
by way of notice-and-comment rulemaking. Key to our view is
our conclusion that the Court should avoid making civilprocedure policy through its adjudicatory power and that major
policy choices in this field should be made by referring any certworthy, non-statutory-construction questions that emerge from
the Court’s management of federal litigation to the rulemaking
process. This proposed model is one premised upon institutional competencies, which is in line with the key insight from legal
process theory that seeking institutional advantage as to the
338
entity that resolves legal disputes is paramount. The position
is that among the federal lower courts, the Supreme Court, and
the Advisory Committee, when it comes to making major
changes to the policies underlying the Rules, the Advisory
Committee possesses institutional advantages such that there
should be a presumption in favor of referral to that committee
instead of setting policy by adjudication in the Supreme Court.
Moreover, adherence to the process of referral to the Advisory
Committee, as we discussed above, respects the important
principle of institutional settlement as embodied in the Rules
339
Enabling Act.
340
Consider Schlagenhauf v. Holder by way of example.
Rule 35 allows district courts to order the physical or mental
examination of a party over that party’s protest, if the stand341
ards of “in controversy” and “good cause” are met. Despite
335. While there may be a meaningful theoretical difference between “implementation” and “interpretation,” see generally, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law? A Dialogue with Richard
Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 889 (2007) (discussing the potential distinction), we need not work out the nuances of this
distinction here.
336. Administrative law scholars similarly find the choice of policymaking
form a central question. For citations to this extensive literature, see Magill,
supra note 38, at 1403 n.69; Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 10, at 1206 n.100.
337. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note
10, at 1212–15.
338. See supra Part I.D.
339. See supra Part II.A (critiquing the inherent authority view).
340. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
341. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a).
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policy concerns regarding the potential for abuse, the
Schlagenhauf Court held that “Rule 35 on its face applies to all
‘parties,’ which under any normal reading would include a de342
fendant.” Dissenting, Justice Douglas concluded that even
though the text mandated an application of Rule 35 to defend343
ants, such a rule was rife with risk for “blackmail.” Concluding that safeguards should be provided, he stated:
This is a problem that we should refer to the Civil Rules Committee of
the Judicial Conference so that if medical and psychiatric clinics are
to be used in discovery against defendants—whether in negligence, libel, or contract cases—the standards and conditions will be discriminating and precise. . . . Lines must in time be drawn; and I think the
new Civil Rules Committee is better equipped than we are to draw
344
them initially.

We contend that Justice Douglas got it right as to those instances where the Justices harbor policy concerns with a rule.
If the Justices disagree with the policy position embedded in
the Rules, or believe a policy outcome was not considered by the
drafters, then the appropriate course is to refer the matter to
the Advisory Committee. This conclusion follows because the
Advisory Committee, in matters of policy, holds all the institu345
tional advantages described above. These are the exact advantages Justice Douglas sought in the Rule 35 context. Thus,
as the Court explicitly held in Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, if the Court believes that the clear text of a Rule will lead to poor policy outcomes, relief “must be obtained by the process of amending the
346
Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”
We have seen a similar dynamic at play with Rule 11. Recall the Pavelic & LeFlore case we discussed above where the
Court held, over a strong purposive dissent, that law firms
347
could not be sanctioned under Rule 11. In 1993, the Advisory
Committee re-drafted Rule 11 so that “a law firm is to be held
348
also responsible . . . as a result of a motion under” Rule 11.
The amended Rule made full use of the institutional advantages of the Advisory Committee. First, the Advisory Committee conducted an extensive empirical review and considered
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

379 U.S. at 112.
Id. at 127 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id.
See supra notes 320–25 and accompanying text.
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989).
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
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349

multiple points of view. Second, in crafting the new rule, the
Advisory Committee coupled the law-firm-liability reform with
a then-new so-called “safe harbor” provision, which prohibits
sanctions unless “within 21 days after service of the motion”
350
the offending motion is not withdrawn. In an action that the
Court as an adjudicator could never do, the Advisory Committee concluded that “it is appropriate that the law firm ordinarily be viewed as jointly responsible under established principles
of agency” if after notice and twenty-one days an offending mo351
tion has not been withdrawn. Similarly, in the aftermath of
Twombly, many concluded that the Court was right to be concerned with explosive discovery costs in anti-trust cases, but
that it would have done better to refer the matter to the Advisory Committee to craft new rules more carefully tailored to
that specific problem, such as a proposed early motion for
summary judgment, rather than changing all of pleading law
352
by adjudication. All this is to say, nearly all agree that policy
changes are better crafted by the Advisory Committee than by
353
the Court sitting as an adjudicator.
349. Id. (identifying the relevant studies that were considered).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 71, at 881–85 (discussing lower courts’ limited discovery, early summary judgment approach as well as noting that there
are “legitimate screening concerns addressed by Twombly” but that the “Supreme Court is not the optimal institution to design a strict pleading rule”);
Bone, supra note 139, at 889 (“[A] centralized, court-based, and committeecentered process is well suited for making general constitutive rules that define the basic framework of a civil procedure system and more detailed rules
that control particularly costly forms of strategic behavior.”); Clermont &
Yeazell, supra note 67, at 850 (“It is entirely arguable that pleading should
provide additional, and more vigorous, gatekeeping. But before discarding the
pleading system that has been in place for many years, we ought to discuss its
virtues and failures soberly and with the relevant information before us. The
rulemaking bodies should have hosted that discussion.”); Spencer, supra note
71, at 454 (“[T]he rule amendment process is preferable because it is a much
more democratic, transparent, and accountable method of making changes to
the Federal Rules.”); The Supreme Court 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121
HARV. L. REV. 185, 305–15 (2007) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (“The majority,
motivated by legitimate concern over the large costs that discovery places on
defendants, had good intentions. But a judicial opinion is the wrong forum for
enacting a major change to settled interpretations of the Federal Rules.”); Nathan R. Sellers, Note, Defending the Formal Federal Civil Rulemaking Process:
Why the Court Should Not Amend Procedural Rules Through Judicial Interpretation, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 378–79 (2011) (“The Court is not wellsuited to making these policy decisions in the procedural context, especially
compared to the formal rulemaking bodies.”).
353. We address this point exhaustively in prior work. See Mulligan &

2017]

CIVIL RULES INTERPRETIVE THEORY

2225

B. RESOLUTION BY THE COURT AS AN ADJUDICATOR
This is not to say that resolution of Rules questions by the
Court sitting as an adjudicator is never appropriate. Indeed,
just as an agency will often resolve discrete problems by adjudication or issue guidance, the Court should continue to address non-policy-setting matters in Rules cases by way of adjudication. The Court should only decide such cases, however,
when the issues are cert-worthy under the Court’s normal
standards for making such determinations, and the case is capable of being resolved pursuant to traditional tools of purposive construction, by which we specifically mean to include non354
textualist tools of interpretation. We find that such matters
fall into two broad camps, which we address in turn: (1) textual
exegesis questions; and (2) equity standard-setting issues.
1. Issues Explicitly Resolved by Rulemakers
As we explained in Part I.D, the first element of any theory
of Rules interpretation should be that the judiciary must respect the principle of institutional settlement, which requires
federal courts to follow the identifiable policy choices of the
rulemakers. We recognize, however, that following this directive may be easier said than done, and we have therefore
borrowed from administrative law to provide concrete guidance
regarding how courts should perform this task.
Our approach, which calls for some cases to be routed to
the Advisory Committee while others will be resolved by the
Court as an adjudicator, demands a mechanism for making
choices of policymaking form. In our prior work, we attempted
to describe this mechanism for choosing between
decisionmaking by the Advisory Committee or by the Court sitting as an adjudicative body by way of three administrative law
355
analogies. First, we argued that if a Rules case requires an
interpretation that rests substantially upon legislative facts
(i.e., “those [facts that] a tribunal seeks in order to assist itself
in the legislative process of creating law or determining poli356
cy” ), as opposed to adjudicative facts (i.e., historical facts of a
Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 10, at 1207–12.
354. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted
only for compelling reasons.”); Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 10, at 1193.
355. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note
10, at 1215–34.
356. Kenneth Culp Davis, Official Notice, 62 HARV. L. REV. 537, 549 (1949).
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dispute the determination of which traditionally falls within
357
the province of the jury ), the matter should be referred to the
Advisory Committee. We so concluded because of the consensus
among administrative law scholars that notice-and-comment
rulemaking is the superior forum for unearthing legislative
358
facts, especially in light of the courts’ well-known inability efficiently to create robust records that rely upon legislative
359
facts. Similarly, we argued that the Court should refer Rules
issues to the court rulemaking process when those issues would
be resolved pursuant to the second step of a Chevron-like inquiry because they effectively involve policymaking, as opposed
to those situations when the Court could resolve the interpretive problem as a matter of law under Chevron step one by
360
“employing traditional tools of statutory construction,” which
specifically include purposive and intentionalist tools. Providing yet a third analogy, we looked to the distinction between
legislative and interpretive rules in administrative law and ar-

357. FED. R. EVID. 201(a); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d
224, 244 n.52 (5th Cir. 1976) (Brown, J., concurring) (citing Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–16 (1942)).
358. See, e.g., Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 244–45
(5th Cir. 1976) (Brown, J., concurring) (“Though a court, with its adversary
procedure, is not necessarily precluded from resolving issues of legislative fact,
it is generally thought that their determination is particularly appropriate to
the administrative process, where staffs of specialists and great storehouses of
information are available.” (citation omitted)); PIERCE, supra note 321, § 6.4.3,
at 326; Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 941
(1980) (“A remand to an agency might often produce better results than a remand to a trial court, because the trial court’s procedure is likely to be the
same as it would be for finding adjudicative facts.”); Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1986) (“The conclusion
is overwhelming that the Supreme Court lacks the essential institutional arrangement for developing the legislative facts on which some of its lawmaking
should rest.”).
359. See, e.g., Henry Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and
Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 37–38 (1978) (criticizing the Court’s handling of issues of legislative fact in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Arthur
Selwyn Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System,
and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L.
REV. 1187, 1233–45 (1975) (suggesting ways to improve the Court’s means of
legislative fact development); Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 113 (1988) (discussing various proposals to deal with the “haphazard way in which courts receive legislative facts”).
360. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
n.9 (1984).

2017]

CIVIL RULES INTERPRETIVE THEORY

2227

gued that issues that could be decided as valid interpretive
rules are appropriate for resolution pursuant to adjudication,
whereas policy decisions that would effectively result in the
creation of “legislative rules” should be referred to rulemaking.
Our expectation was that these three analogies would work in
concert to offer helpful advice in routing Rules questions either
to the Court as an adjudicator or to the Advisory Committee.
For those matters retained by the Court as an adjudicator,
we, in league with the regime-specific purposive model, favor a
purposive approach to Rules interpretation. We anticipate that
the Court would rely heavily on the plain meaning of the text of
the Rules and their broader legal and historical context to identify their purposes and constrain the scope of their permissible
361
meaning, and we anticipate that the Advisory Committee
notes would be a particularly fruitful resource for identifying
362
the explicit policy choices of the rulemakers. We believe that
objections to the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation are obviated in this context by the fact that the Advisory
Committee notes are required by the Rules Enabling Act, and
they accompany a proposed rule throughout the course of the
rulemaking process—and they are therefore readily available
to other participants, elected officials, and the general public
363
before a proposed rule can be finalized. The rulemaking process also provides formal opportunities for participants to dissent from the contents of the notes, and they cannot easily be

361. See supra Part I.D (describing the dual role of the statutory text in legal process theory); see also Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309
(2001) (arguing that procedural statutes should be interpreted in light of
background principles of law in the field of civil procedure which are discoverable to federal courts with expertise in this area).
362. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 965–67 (arguing that the textualist critique of legislative history does not undermine the validity of “an inclusive
method that permits courts to use a broad range of sources extrinsic to the
text of the Federal Rules as they try to apply a rule consistent with rulemaker
intent and purpose,” and recognizing that the advisory committee notes belong
at the top of a hierarchy of rulemaking history); Struve, supra note 10, at
1152–69 (claiming that the role of the advisory committee notes in the court
rulemaking process demonstrates that they “possess distinctive claims to authority, based both on the terms of the Enabling Act and on the practicalities
of rulemaking”).
363. For similar reasons, Jennifer Nou and Kevin Stack both argue that
regulatory preambles should be given substantial weight in the interpretation
of federal administrative regulations from the perspectives of textualism and
purposivism, respectively. See Nou, supra note 277, at 116–18; Stack, supra
note 166, at 391.
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manipulated because they receive careful attention at each
stage of the process from people who can be expected to under364
stand and pay relatively close attention to the issues. We are
therefore confident that the court rulemaking process creates a
formal record that provides a rich source of information that
would allow the federal judiciary to identify and implement the
deliberate policy choices of the rulemakers in civil procedure
cases.
While our proposed model embraces some notable differences between the proper role of the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts in Rules interpretation—namely only the Court
has the certiorari power and the ability to reference issues to
the Advisory Committee—the disparities should be minimal
when the rulemakers have explicitly resolved an issue. We contend that lower federal courts, like the Supreme Court, should
respect the text of the Rules and follow the ascertainable intent
of the rulemakers. There will, however, be issues of first impression, which will require lower federal courts to exercise
some discretion in reasonably elaborating upon or extending
the purposes of the rulemakers. It is also possible that circumstances could change substantially enough to create the functional equivalent of unanticipated problems, and that lower
federal courts, in matters where the Supreme Court has yet to
act, may resolve those issues in a reasoned fashion that deviat365
ed from the original intent of the rulemakers. Generally
speaking, however, we believe that all federal courts should resolve the civil procedure issues that arise during adjudication
consistent with the identifiable policy choices of the
rulemakers. Accordingly, our proposed approach to Rules interpretation would respect the rule of law and the principle of
institutional settlement.
366
The pre-Twombly case of Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. is
illustrative. The issue here was whether, under Rule 8(a)(2), a
364. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (2015) (“In making a recommendation under
this section or under section 2072 or 2075, the body making that recommendation shall provide a proposed rule, an explanatory note on the rule, and a written report explaining the body’s action, including any minority or other separate views.” (emphasis added)).
365. Such rare instances of lower-court deviation from rule-maker intent,
we believe tends to show the matter sufficiently ripe for the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari and refer the issue to the Advisory Committee. When viewed
in this context, we think such action a strength of our approach as lower-court
deviation from rule-maker intent acts as a strong signalling device.
366. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
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complaint in an employment discrimination case must contain
specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination
367
per McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Engaging in a purposive analysis of the text, the Court held that such a heightened
pleading requirement was not required. The Sorema Court
368
turned first to the text of Rule 8(a)(2). It then examined the
purpose of the rule, which it concluded was to establish a no369
tice-pleading regime. It then considered how “[o]ther provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inextricably
linked to” the drafter-created policy choice embedded within a
370
Thus, in cert-worthy cases which
notice-pleading regime.
raise issues that can be resolved in a purposive fashion akin to
Sorema, we conclude (as further elaborated below) that the Supreme Court as an adjudicator holds the institutional advantages over the Advisory Committee and lower courts in regard to achieving legitimate, correct, and efficient dispositions.
2. Elaboration and Application of Discretionary Standards
There remains a distinct category of issues—the finetuning of standards for lower-court equitable discretion—that
is also readily amenable to resolution by the Supreme Court as
an adjudicator. As explained above, the Rules merged law and
371
equity, and numerous rules provide lower courts with equitable discretion to achieve just results in particular cases. This
discretion is conveyed in some instances by explicit grants of
372
discretionary authority. Such discretion is also conveyed in
many instances by the rulemakers’ choice of text. For example,
the rules frequently require courts to “answer questions of de373
gree and relativity,” such as whether a “class is so numerous
374
that joinder of all members is impracticable,” or whether a
proposed “amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted
375
to be set out—in the original pleading.”

367. Id. at 508 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973)).
368. Id. at 512 (quoting the Rule’s text).
369. Id.
370. Id. at 513.
371. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
373. Porter, supra note 10, at 164.
374. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
375. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B).
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Our agency model fully embraces this equitable, fact-laden,
and discretionary aspect of Rules interpretation and recognizes
that the primary authority for making decisions in these areas
properly rests with federal district courts. This distribution of
authority comports with the underlying purposes and design of
the Rules, and recognizes that district court judges are typically best situated to make such decisions based on their relevant
experience and perspective. We think that the Supreme Court
should rarely review such decisions, and that appellate review
should ordinarily be limited to whether the district court
abused its discretion.
We further contend that it is sometimes appropriate for the
Court to use adjudication to clarify how equitable standards
should be applied as a general matter by lower courts—and
that this function is compatible with a purposive method of
376
Rules interpretation. The administrative law analogies that
we initially proposed to distinguish policy-setting cases from
cases that could be resolved pursuant to traditional tools of
construction do not work particularly well in this context, however, because putting meat on the bones of these equitable
standards could conceivably turn on legislative facts or require
the resolution of Chevron-step-two-like ambiguity or even in377
volve the functional equivalent of a legislative rule. Our model therefore requires a different mechanism to distinguish efforts to provide guidance to lower courts regarding the proper
application or boundaries of discretionary standards, which we
think is an appropriate function of adjudication, and the creation of novel procedural policy, which should once again be referred to the court rulemaking process.
We think that the proper boundaries of the Court’s use of
adjudication to provide equitable guidance should be determined by focusing on the type of reasoning to be deployed, as
opposed to the precise nature of the question presented, and we
therefore draw on other administrative law analogies to make
this distinction. In each of our analogies, we are fundamentally
aiming to route questions to the body best constituted to address the matter. For example, our push to send legislative-fact
matters to the Advisory Committee rests upon that institution’s
superior ability to engage in broad empirical investigations as
376. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence, supra note 10,
at 70–73 (suggesting that such clarification is akin to an administrative agency’s general statement of policy).
377. See id. at 76–77.
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compared to the Court sitting as an adjudicatory body. Such a
focus upon institutional advantage, moreover, sits well within
the legal process school as an expression of the philosophy’s fo379
cus on the structural features of the law. In crafting the
mechanisms for effectuating choices of policymaking form,
then, we continue to adhere to our main motivating principle:
Rules matters should be resolved by the institution holding the
most institutional competence vis-à-vis the precise decisional
tasks presented.
To this end, we adopt Randy Kozel and Jeffrey
Pojanowski’s distinction between prescriptive and expository
reasoning in administrative decisionmaking as helpful in the
equitable-standard-setting context, even if not a perfect fit in
380
every instance. Kozel and Pojanowski describe decisions that
call for the weighing of evidence, utilizing technical expertise,
and making value judgments as prescriptive, while decisions
that call for an analysis of the drafter’s intent or the boundaries
381
of judicial case law are defined as expository. Applying this
distinction, Kozel and Pojanowski conclude that prescriptive
reasoning—or what we have labeled as policy-change decisions
in the Rules setting—constitutes one of the “core competencies”
382
of notice-and-comment agency decision-making.
Seeking similar institutional advantages in the Rules setting, if the resolution of a Rules dispute in a cert-worthy case
would primarily hinge upon prescriptive reasoning (knowing
full well that most cases will not solely involve one mode of reasoning or the other), then the dispute should go to the Advisory
Committee because it has the stronger institutional capacities
383
to take on such a task. Conversely, as Kozel and Pojanowski
378. See generally Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121 (2002) (documenting efforts since the late 1980s by the Advisory Committee to solicit and
otherwise encourage empirical studies regarding proposed rule changes); see
also Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 67, at 859 (“The rulemakers should soon
commence a study of exactly where . . . the optimal pleading standard lies.”);
Sellers, supra note 352, at 366 (“[T]he Advisory Committee can commission
research into the costs and benefits of a proposed amendment.”); Struve, supra
note 10, at 1140 (similar); Leading Cases, supra note 352, at 313 (similar).
379. Fallon, supra note 179.
380. Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59
UCLA L. REV. 112, 143 (2011) (recognizing that the distinction between prescriptive and expository decisionmaking is not always crystal clear).
381. Id. at 141–42.
382. Id. at 141.
383. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note
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demonstrate, the appellate courts hold the institutional advantage when it comes to expository reasoning—i.e., deploying
the traditional tools of statutory construction broadly conceived
384
to include purposive and intentionalist approaches. Following
this insight, we contend that in these cert-worthy cases, where
the predominant mode of discourse will be expository—be it in
implementing a relatively detailed rule-based regime or in finetuning equitable standards for lower-court application—the
Court should retain the matter for its own disposition sitting as
a judicial entity.
Consistent with our central focus on institutional competencies and with a new complementary analogy to administrative law doctrine, we maintain that equity standard-setting
cases should continue to be resolved by the Supreme Court in
adjudication. Indeed, we think that when the Court provides
guidance to lower courts regarding the proper application of the
equitable standards set forth in the rules, the Court is provid385
ing the rough equivalent of “general statements of policy.”
This is partly the case because the Court is providing guidance
to its subordinates regarding how it plans to interpret or apply
the Rules in the future, and such guidance has informational
value that helps to facilitate the consistent and predictable application of the law in a context where the Court (or agency
heads) could not feasibly review every decision. It makes sense
to offer this guidance in adjudication, continuing the administrative law analogy, because agencies are similarly not required to use notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures when
386
they provide such guidance. Finally, while such guidance
channels discretion and provides the lower courts with useful
information about the relevant factors that should inform their
decisions when they implement the rules, the guidance does not
change the substance of the rules or ordinarily dictate the re387
sult in any particular case. At the same time, however, the
10, at 1221–27 (describing this same choice in terms of an analogy to Chevron).
384. See Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 380, at 149.
385. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331 (2011) (providing a
helpful overview of the applicable law, and recommending deferential standards for judicial review of the validity of guidance documents).
386. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2015).
387. For these reasons, administrative guidance is not binding upon the
public. Of course, the Court’s decision is binding precedent for lower courts as
a matter of stare decisis. Again, we do not mean to suggest that this analogy is
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adoption of the administrative agency model does not preclude
deference to the lower federal courts in Rules cases. Rather,
cases involving the application of equitable standards should be
resolved initially—and, for the most part, exclusively—in the
lower federal courts, as we have been emphasizing, and any
high-Court review should be conducted under an abuse of dis388
cretion standard.
The foregoing division of responsibilities best promotes the
competencies of each of the relevant institutional actors in
Rules cases. Thus, the administrative model recognizes that
there is little need to use notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to address problems that can be resolved using traditional tools of purposive construction. Rather, courts are wellsituated to ascertain how the rulemakers previously decided
such questions or to flesh out the contours of equitable standards during the course of adjudication. Accordingly, if the Court
can use traditional tools of purposive construction to resolve an
important dispute about the best understanding of the rules at
issue, it should continue to use its adjudicatory authority to do
so. If, however, the Court wants to change the controlling understanding of the rules (i.e., the underlying policy choice embedded in a rule), the Court should refer the relevant questions
to the Advisory Committee for resolution pursuant to the rulemaking process. Finally, allowing the lower courts to exercise
predominant control over the equitable discretion that occurs in
federal litigation provides a variety of institutional advantages
as well.
389
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard is illustrative of the approach we
favor in equitable-standard-setting cases. The opinion interpreted Rule 23(d), which then stated that in “the conduct of
[class] actions to which this rule applied, the court may make
appropriate orders: . . . (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors . . . [and] (5) dealing with
390
similar procedural matters.” In an employment discrimination suit, the district court, pursuant to Rule 23(d)(3), entered
an order prohibiting the parties and their counsel from communicating with potential class members without court apperfect, but it does provide further evidence of the value of using administrative law principles to inform the Court’s regulation of civil procedure.
388. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence, supra note 10,
at 82.
389. 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
390. Id. at 99.
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proval. The Court reversed as an abuse of discretion. In so
deciding, the Court first looked to “the general policies embod393
ied in Rule 23, which governs class actions in federal court.”
The Supreme Court also noted that because of the “potential for
abuse, a district court has both the duty and the broad authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropri394
ate orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties.”
Concluding, however, that this discretion must be bounded and
subject to abuse of discretion review, the Court held that such
“an order limiting communications between parties and potential class members should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation
395
and the potential interference with the rights of the parties.”
That is to say, taking a purposive interpretive approach, that is
a hallmark of expository reasoning, the Supreme Court crafted
equitable standards that furthered the policy choices enacted
by the Advisory Committee. The Court further held that
[o]nly such a determination can ensure that the [district] court is furthering, rather than hindering, the policies embodied in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, especially Rule 23. In addition, such a
weighing—identifying the potential abuses being addressed—should
result in a carefully drawn order that limits speech as little as possible, consistent with the rights of the parties under the circumstanc396
es.

C. THE CIVIL RULES REGULATORY REGIME
We have already responded in print to a number of stated
or potential objections to our proposed model of Rules interpre397
tation, and we do not want to reiterate all of those points
here. There is an underlying theme to these objections, however, that is worthy of brief discussion. The central concern is
that the court rulemaking process has certain flaws that inhibit
effective rulemaking, and as a result the Court should be empowered to circumvent this process. This concern has its own
administrative law analogues, and while we will readily con391. Id. at 93.
392. Id. at 102–03.
393. Id. at 99.
394. Id. at 100.
395. Id. at 101.
396. Id. at 101–02.
397. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note
10, at 1237–51; Mulligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence, supra note
10, at 84–90.
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cede that the court rulemaking process is imperfect, we are
unmoved by these objections for several reasons.
We turn now to particular objections. The first counterargument is that the court rulemaking process is “ossified,” which
creates an incentive for the Court to make novel procedural pol398
icy through adjudication. This objection tracks the ossification hypothesis in administrative law, which posits that because various analytic requirements and external review
processes make notice-and-comment rulemaking too timeconsuming and expensive, regulatory agencies have strong incentives to make policy through less formal and participatory
mechanisms such as interpretive rules, guidance documents,
399
and adjudication. The parallel concern is that the promulgation of new or amended civil rules currently takes roughly thir400
ty months, and innovations or changes cannot be adopted
without the express or tacit approval of five different decisionmaking bodies. Accordingly, if a majority of Justices think that
major policy changes are warranted, it is far easier and more
efficient for the Court to take the bull by the horns and adopt
them pursuant to adjudication, particularly if those changes
are likely to be controversial and generate potentially fatal objections during the rulemaking process.
A second related objection is that the Court has limited
control over court rulemaking, and this strengthens the incentive for the Justices to make novel procedural policy pursuant
401
to adjudication. This objection correctly recognizes that the
Court functions as an administrator in the field of civil procedure, but contends that this particular regulatory scheme is
distinct from most administrative settings because the Justices
have less control over final policy decisions than most agency
heads. From an administrative law perspective, the regulatory
regime in civil procedure could be viewed as one that is “bottom

398. Cf. Porter, supra note 10, at 182–83 (suggesting that our referencing
proposal would overwhelm the Advisory Committee, and claiming that “even
assuming the rulemakers could appropriately handle all of these questions,
resource constraints, the lengthy rulemaking process, and a likely lack of consensus would be serious obstacles to responsive reform”); Yeazell, supra note
142 (noting that the contemporary rulemaking process has become more cumbersome with little added benefit).
399. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven
Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995).
400. See McCabe, supra note 105.
401. See Porter, supra note 10, at 147.
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up,” rather than one that is authoritatively controlled by agen402
cy heads (or their political principles) in a “top-down” fashion.
Justices who want to dictate policy outcomes in civil procedure
will therefore naturally be prone toward making policy decisions pursuant to adjudication (the part of the process that is
effectively under their control), rather than deferring to court
rulemaking.
A third objection is that the court rulemaking process has
become “politicized” in recent years and the resulting policy decisions may therefore be excessively influenced by interest403
group pressure, rather than a result of “neutral expertise.”
Similar concerns of undue politicization have, of course, been a
prominent theme in the administrative law literature in recent
404
years. Whatever the proper cure for undue politicization in
the administrative process (a tough issue, to be sure), one could
argue that it is sensible for an independent Court to make procedural policy pursuant to adjudication, rather than deferring
to the outcomes of a more overtly partisan political process.
In response, we welcome rulemaking reforms. We are on
record as seeking to reduce the current overly cumbersome
drafting process to streamline its operation and encourage
405
greater involvement by the Justices. In particular, we have
advocated for the adoption of a three-step model that would include notice-and-comment rulemaking by the Advisory Committee, Court review, and Congressional report-and-wait. We
have estimated that this process could be completed in a period
of approximately eighteen months, and we have expressed hope

402. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note
10, at 1205 n.98 (“[T]he current court rulemaking model is best described as a
bottom-up process, whereas agency rulemaking is traditionally described as a
top-down process.”); Porter, supra note 10, at 147 (“Ironically, then, the
Court’s position at the top of the administrative hierarchy effectively cuts it
out of the process of initial revisions of Rules.”).
403. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of
Judgment, and the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U.
L. REV. 1561, 1612 (2008) (claiming that “the court rulemaking process has
become increasingly politicized” since the 1980s, and that this development
“has made it very difficult to revise the FRCP in general . . . because conflicting interest group pressures tend to create Advisory Committee stalemate”);
see also supra notes 143–47 and accompanying text (discussing these critiques).
404. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport:
Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671 (2012).
405. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note
10, at 1237–40.
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that by eliminating the roles of the Judicial Conference and
Standing Committee, and otherwise streamlining the court
rulemaking process, the Court would be encouraged to revive
its more active role in reviewing, evaluating, and contributing
to potential changes to the Rules. We also agree with Brooke
Coleman that membership on the Advisory Committee can, and
should, be more representative of the bar and more attuned to
typical cases as contrasted with high-stakes complex litiga406
tion.
Nonetheless, we do not believe that the foregoing objections—even without making these worthy reforms—provide a
compelling basis for rejecting our proposed model of Rules interpretation. First, criticisms of the court rulemaking process
(whether valid or not) fundamentally miss the mark when not
comparatively made. The relevant question is whether court
rulemaking is a superior mechanism for making novel procedural policy than Supreme Court adjudication, not whether the
existing court rulemaking process (or, for that matter, Court
adjudication) is perfectly ideal. Our claim is that court rulemaking in policy-setting matters (warts and all) is generally
superior to Court adjudication (warts and all) for a host of reasons. To our minds, a valid critique of our proposal would need
to take the opposite position, not merely identify flaws with the
existing rulemaking process. The choice of policymaking form
in this context is a bounded one with only two alternatives—
and referral to a utopian “perfect” rulemaking process is not an
option that is currently on the table. Thus, we reiterate the
407
many advantages, as discussed above, that the notice-andcomment approach to setting procedural policy enjoys.
Second, those objections are, at bottom, merely a relatively
sophisticated version of the argument for an inherent-authority
model of Rules interpretation. The objections boil down to
claims that court rulemaking takes too long and is inconvenient, and that it undermines the ability of the Justices to adopt
their own preferred procedural policies. As Lonny Hoffman
puts this family of critiques, the Court is saying “to rulemakers:
out of my way. Can’t you see that modern litigation is totally
different from what it was in 1938? Why haven’t you done
408
something by now?” Wouldn’t it be less burdensome and more
406. See Coleman, supra note 145, at 1049–51.
407. See supra notes 321–25 and accompanying text (outlining these advantages).
408. Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in the Age of Twombly and Iqbal, 46
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efficacious for the Court to use adjudication to make novel procedural policy pursuant to common-law reasoning or a dynamic
method of Rules interpretation?
Well, sure, and this might therefore be a good idea—if the
goal of civil rules interpretation was quickly and surely to implement the procedural policy preferences of the Justices. As
we have explained, however, the inherent-authority model is
contrary to the scheme established by the Rules Enabling Act,
inconsistent with rule-of-law norms, and incompatible with the
409
Moreover, the court
principle of institutional settlement.
rulemaking process has epistemic advantages, in addition to
promoting democracy and treating litigants more fairly. Accordingly, we believe that the benefits of presumptively using
court rulemaking to make novel procedural policy easily outweigh the costs of constraining the Justices’ ability unilaterally
to impose their own views of sound procedural policy pursuant
to adjudication.
Finally, and relatedly, we think the existing regulatory
scheme for civil procedure has significant advantages, even if it
departs from standard administrative law models or falls short
of a romanticized ideal. We agree, of course, that the regulatory
regime for civil procedure departs from a pure top-down model
in the sense that the Justices cannot impose their own policy
preferences over the objections of other participants in the process. In particular, the Justices cannot amend the Rules without the positive efforts and endorsements of the Advisory
Committee, Standing Committee, and Judicial Conference.
Meanwhile, however, the regulatory regime for civil procedure
departs from a pure bottom-up model in the sense that the Justices, or the Chief Justice in particular, do appoint the members of these relevant committees, have final adjudicatory authority, and the ability to reject proposed amendments they do
not favor. Nonetheless, our proposed model of Rules interpretation anticipates that the bulk of policymaking discretion should
be exercised by lower federal courts and the Advisory Committee in a bottom-up fashion. This would effectively result in a
“hybrid” regulatory regime that contains both top-down and
bottom-up elements and matches the actual competencies of
each of the relevant institutional actors.

U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1483, 1512 (2013).
409. See supra Part II.A (critiquing the inherent-authority model).
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While we believe it inappropriate to reject our proposal
merely because court rulemaking falls short of a romanticized
ideal, we also think that our proposal is strengthened by comparing the court rulemaking process with notice-and-comment
rulemaking by many other agencies. First, the implicit notion
that the Court sitting as an adjudicator, while surely speedier
than the Advisory Committee, is freer of bias or more prone to
empirical rigor than the Advisory Committee is simply spe410
cious. Both the Justices themselves and the Supreme Court
411
bar are archetypes of elites, which carries all the biases at412
tendant therewith. Furthermore, just as with charges against
413
the Advisory Committee, the Court often relies upon nonempirically based, politically charged factual assumptions in
414
setting procedural policy, yet it lacks the notice-and-comment
check to counterbalance such errors. While we cannot provide a
full-fledged comparison here, and further empirical work to
evaluate our impressions would be helpful, we are confident
that the court rulemaking process is a relatively vibrant one,
and that “politicization” of this process, to the extent it has oc415
curred, is therefore less detrimental than it would be in many
other contexts. As discussed above, the Advisory Committee’s
proposals tend to generate a tremendous amount of commen416
tary from judges, attorneys, scholars, and the general public.
Moreover, this commentary tends to be relatively wellinformed, and to reflect relatively balanced views from a varie410. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience
and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL.
L. REV. 903 (2003); Patrick J. Glen, Harvard and Yale Ascendant: The Legal
Education of the Justices from Holmes to Kagan, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE
129 (2010); Timothy P. O’Neill, “The Stepford Justices”: The Need for Experiential Diversity on the Roberts Court, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 701 (2007).
411. See Coleman, supra note 145, at 1015–19.
412. See, e.g., Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137, 141 (2013); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 821 (2011).
413. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
414. See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 67, at 848–49; Herrmann et
al., supra note 70, at 150–52.
415. While there is a widespread perception that court rulemaking has become increasingly politicized in recent years, see supra notes 143–47 and accompanying text, we are skeptical that the “golden age of rulemaking” was
apolitical or that the Advisory Committee’s decisions were solely a function of
“neutral expertise.” Rather, this perception may be influenced in part by the
fact that today’s rulemaking process is significantly more openly participatory
and transparent than in the past.
416. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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ty of competing perspectives, including those of trial attorneys,
the defense bar, and other interested parties. Finally, the Advisory Committee tends to be responsive to major comments or
suggestions by providing reasoned explanations for its decisions and, in many cases, amending its proposals as a result.
While administrative rulemaking plainly runs the gamut,
agencies have been heavily criticized for deficiencies in each of
417
these areas in recent years. We think that court rulemaking
fares relatively well in each of these areas, and that it is even a
context where the requirements of “interest group representa418
tion” theory could conceivably be met. In any event, even if
court rulemaking falls short of being “one of the greatest inven419
tions of modern government,” we think that it is a relatively
sound rulemaking process—and, more important for present
purposes, that it is a superior mechanism for making civil procedure policy than Supreme Court adjudication.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we argued that civil rules interpretive theory should be recognized as a distinctive field of scholarly inquiry and judicial practice. In this endeavor, we described the
existing theories of Rules interpretation that are set forth in
the nascent scholarly literature, and advocated an administrative model of Rules interpretation. More broadly, we conclude
that our views on Rules interpretation illustrate that the best
form of interpretation depends on legal context, the nature of
the lawmaking process, and the competencies of the relevant
420
institutional actors. We hope, therefore, that this Article will
help to stimulate other legal scholarship and more thoughtful

417. For a recent analysis of public participation in rulemaking and the
level of responsiveness by agencies to various types of comments, see Nina A.
Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of Email, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1343 (2011).
418. The interest group representation model of administrative law, which
predominated in the 1960s and 1970s, sought to provide “a surrogate political
process to ensure the fair representation of a wide range of affected interests
in the process of administrative decision.” Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (1975).
419. Cf. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.15, at
283 (1st ed. Supp. 1970) (calling informal rulemaking by administrative agencies “one of the greatest inventions of modern government”).
420. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing that Interpretation
Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 193 (2015).
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judicial engagement with the emerging field of Rules interpretive theory.
Indeed, we believe that recognizing civil rules interpretive
theory as a distinctive field of inquiry raises a host of interesting, important, and previously unexplored questions. For example, it may be worthwhile to consider whether the oftrecognized distinction between “interpretation” and “construc421
tion” could perform a potentially useful role in this setting.
Moreover, it is also worth considering whether our proposed
administrative model of Rules interpretation should be extended to the contexts of the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because both sets of Rules
are adopted by the federal judiciary pursuant to delegations of
authority under the Rules Enabling Act, they should not be
treated the same as statutes for purposes of interpretive theory. On the other hand, those rulemaking processes could involve special characteristics or norms that would suggest caution in simply adopting our administrative model without
appropriate modifications. For example, criminal procedure is
rife with constitutional concerns that would need to be considered when adopting an interpretive methodology for that par422
ticular legal context.
Similarly, it is worth considering how our proposed method
of civil rules interpretation should be synthesized with the federal judiciary’s obligation to interpret federal procedural stat423
utes. Federal statutes reference the Rules often (including
424
the codification of the Rules for bankruptcy practice). Whether codifications of these rules change the separation-of-powers
foundation that supports the interpretation of these rules in
those contexts is a question worthy of consideration. Similarly,
421. See generally Evan J. Criddle, The Constitution of Agency Statutory
Interpretation, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 325 (2016) (analyzing the distinction’s potential role in agency statutory interpretation); Lawrence B. Solum,
The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010)
(describing the distinction and discussing its potential role in constitutional
interpretation).
422. See Stephen F. Smith, Activism As Restraint: Lessons from Criminal
Procedure, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1057 (2002) (arguing for increased constitutional
law interpretive norms in criminal procedure cases because “American criminal procedure is constitutional law, and remains so even after thirty years of
conservative revisionism”).
423. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 6306 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 6613 (2012); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1741, 2246, 2409 (2012); 39 U.S.C. § 3007 (2012). This list is by no means
exhaustive.
424. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9001.
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many federal statutes, such as transfer of venue statutes, work
in conjunction with the Federal Rules, even though they lack
425
explicit cross-references. Again, these regimes raise interesting interpretive questions given the blending of the normative
foundations upon which these competing rules rest.
Finally, it is worth considering how civil rules interpretive
theory ought to work in the states, which have a variety of different approaches for enacting rules of civil procedure for their
courts, and where the rules of civil procedure interact with procedural statutes in a host of different ways. To begin, “[m]ost
states’ rules now mirror the Federal Rules, and the rest have
been pulled toward the Federal Rules in significant ways. In
every state, federal rulemakers have exerted an extraordinary
426
gravitational pull on state rulemakers.” Importantly for our
study, while many states have adopted their rules by judicial
427
rulemaking, many other states adopted the Federal Rules by
428
statute—not judicial rulemaking. We believe that it could follow from our argument that statute-adopting states should approach their civil rules as statutes (contrary to our conclusions
about the Federal Rules), while those states adopting the Federal Rules by court order should approach interpretation in a
manner akin to the one advocated here. Further, we believe
that the persuasive authority of federal precedent may be questioned when there are mismatches of enacting schemes between state and federal systems. While we do not venture any
definitive views on these or other related topics here, we do believe that jurists and scholars should start to think about preparing for battle in a whole different set of possible interpretive
wars.

425. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (2012).
426. Dodson, supra note 11.
427. See, e.g., ALASKA CT. R., R. CIV. P. (adopted by Sup. Ct. Ordinance 5,
October 9, 1959); see also John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in
State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354 (2003) (conducting a fifty state survey of procedural rules).
428. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., R. CIV. P.; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN., R.
CIV. P.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-200 (2016); see also Oakley, supra note 427.

